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Computer networks are the nerve systems of modern enterprises. Unfortunately, these 
networks are subject to numerous attacks. Safeguarding these systems is challenging. In 
this thesis we describe current threats to enterprise security, before concentrating on the 
Distributed denial of Service (DDoS) problem.    
DDoS attacks on popular websites like Amazon, Yahoo, CNN, eBay, Buy, and the 
recent acts of war using DDoS attacks against NATO ally Estonia [1] graphically 
illustrate the seriousness of these attacks. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are explicit 
attempts to block legitimate users’ system access by reducing system availability [2]. A 
DDoS attack deploys multiple attacking entities to attain this goal [3].  Unfortunately, 
DDoS attacks are difficult to prevent and the solutions proposed to date are insufficient. 
This thesis uses combinatorial game theory to analyze the dynamics of DDoS attacks on 
an enterprise and find traffic adaptations that counter the attack.  
This work builds on the DDoS analysis in [4]. The approach we present designs 
networks with a structure that either resists DDoS attacks, or adapts around them. The 
attacker (Red) launches a DDoS on the distributed application (Blue). Both Red and Blue 
play an abstract board game defined on a capacitated graph, where nodes have limited 
CPU capacities and edges have bandwidth constraints. Our technique provides two 
important results that aid in designing DDoS resistant systems:  
1. It quantifies the resources an attacker needs to disable a distributed application. 






2. When the attacker does not have enough resources to satisfy the limit in 1, we 
provide near optimal strategies for reconfiguring the distributed application in 
response to attempted DDoS attacks.  
 
Our analysis starts by finding the feasible network configurations for Blue that satisfy 
its computation and communications requirements. The min-cut sets [5] of these 
configurations are the locations most vulnerable to packet flooding DDoS attacks.  
Red places “zombie” processes on the graph that consume network bandwidth. Red 
attempts to break Blue communications links. Blue reconfigures its network to re-
establish communications. We analyze this board game using the theory of surreal 
numbers [6]. If Blue can make the game “loopy” (i.e. move to one of its previous 
configurations), it wins [7]. If Red creates a situation where Blue can not successfully 
reconfigure the network, it wins.  
In practice, each enterprise relies on multiple distributed processes. Similarly, an 
attacker can not expect to destroy all of the processes used by the enterprise at any point 
in time. The attacker will try to maximize the number of processes it can disable at any 
point in time. This situation describes a “sum of games” problem [6], where Blue and 
Red alternate moves. We adapt Berlekamp’s strategies for Go endgames, to tractably find 
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The Internet has become part of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Critical financial 
services like banking, bill payment, tax payment, booking travel reservations, and 
shopping require secure communications. These communications frequently use the 
Internet [8], and the Internet’s security flaws expose these services to abuse. To be 
secure, a system must provide availability, data integrity, confidentiality, non-
repudiation, access control and authentication [9]. Weakness in any of these areas can be 
exploited to undermine system integrity. A secure system should also be able to correctly 
respond to attacks [4]. A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is an explicit attempt to prevent 
legitimate users of a service from having access to that service [10]. In a Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, multiple compromised systems (called zombies) attack 
a single target. Coordinated DDoS attacks originate from multiple machines 
simultaneously.  
A DoS attack does not usually result in the theft of information. However, these 
attacks on the can cost the target a great deal of time and money. For example the foreign 
governments that cannot attack United States on a battle field due to its military 
dominance could use these low cost, high profile, large effect cyber attacks to cripple its 
defense. The military and civilian information infrastructures are increasingly intertwined 
making the Department of Defense (DoD) dependent on the National Information 
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Infrastructure (NII) for maintaining communications, command control and intelligence 
capabilities [11]. The military infrastructure has been a victim of cyber attacks. In 1997, a 
particular red team of hackers was able to penetrate network defenses and take control of 
the Pacific command center computers, power grids and 911 systems in nine major cities 
of the United States [12]. Later on in 1998, attacks like Solar Sunrise and Moonlight 
Maze on the military infrastructure were also reported [4].  
The number of these attacks on the Internet has risen sharply in the past several years 
and the Internet root servers are vulnerable to these attacks [13]. DDoS attacks, where a 
single attacker (master) coordinates many hijacked systems (zombies) see Figure 1, are 
difficult to trace. It is almost impossible to find the source of a DDoS attack, which 
makes system recovery a slow and costly process. One DDoS attack, which is difficult to 
trace, is the smurf attack. Smurfing uses spoofed broadcast ping messages to flood a 
target system; the attacker directs zombies to send Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMP) traffic to a set of Internet Protocol (IP) broadcast addresses. The ICMP echo 
packets have a spoofed source address pointing to the intended victim. Hosts accept the 
ICMP ping requests and reply to the source address, in this case the victim. This 
multiplies the flooding traffic by the number of responding hosts [14]. This also adds an 



















Figure 1.  DDoS Attack. 
 
DDoS attacks on popular websites: 
• Yahoo, Amazon , CNN, eBay, Buy, etc from February 7th to 11th  2001,  
• The White House on May 4th 2001,  
• Microsoft on January 24th, 2001, and 
• Internet domain name system root servers on October 23rd, 2002  
have brought public attention to the seriousness of this kind of security breach [13].  
Perhaps the best illustration of this problem is the first war fought totally in 
cyberspace; Russia’s attack on Estonia using DDoS attacks in 2007 [1]. The DDoS attack 
Handler Handler







on Estonia continued for three weeks. The e-mail server of the Estonian Parliament and 
the online service of the biggest bank in Estonia were both incapacitated. This 
information war cost Estonia millions of dollars. In response to these attacks, Estonia 
reacted by filtering attack packets. But the authorities have yet to identify the attacking 
computers, thanks to the attacker’s ability to mask (spoof) the IP addresses of 
participating computers. The attackers used about one million compromised computers 
(zombies) in places as far away as the United States and Vietnam to amplify their attack.  
The owners of zombie computers are usually unaware their machines are 
participating in a DDoS attack. This, and the indirect nature of the attack shown in Figure 
1, makes it almost impossible to find the source of an attack. Finding the attack source is 
necessary not only for identifying the attackers, but also for stopping the DDoS attack.   
Estonia’s business sector came to a stand still but all it could do in retaliation was 
filter attack packets. Was there no other way of mitigating these attacks? To thwart these 
attacks we either need to build robust networks that can sustain DDoS attacks or find 
mitigation strategies that stop DDoS attacks before damage is done. 
 
1.2 DoS Mitigation 
Most proposed defenses against DDoS attacks are reactive (attack-specific) and 
involve identifying attack source(s) and deactivating them [15]. Other countermeasures 
involve network monitoring: ingress filtering, egress filtering, intrusion detection, etc. 
Safeguarding a network is good. But rather than waiting for an enemy to attack, it’s better 
to defend a network by eliminating vulnerabilities. 
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1.3 Research Objectives / Contributions 
Our work analyzes a two player game played on a computer network. The computer 
network is modeled by a directed graph structure in which computers are denoted by 
nodes and links connecting computers are represented by arcs.  Player 1 (Blue) is a 
distributed application on the network. Player 2 (Red) is an attacker that places zombie 
processes on network nodes to either: 
1. Attack node capacities.  
 
2. Flood arcs. 
 
We look for the minimum number of zombies required to disable Blue’s distributed 
system. The smallest set of zombies needed to disable all Blue’s possible configurations 
quantifies the resistance of Blue to DDoS attacks. If the attacker does not have enough 
zombies to disable all Blue configurations, Blue can reconfigure to recover from the 
DDoS attack.  This defines a simple board game. Red tries to force Blue into a position 
where it cannot recover by reconfiguring. We use combinatorial game theory to analyze 
this problem. The results we obtain can be used when designing robust networks in the 
future. 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the security measures 
currently used for maintaining enterprise security. Chapter 3 gives background on DoS 
attacks and existing mitigation techniques. Chapter 4 explains how we model the network 
and the key concepts behind our approach. Chapter 5 and chapter 6 explain our approach 
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to attack mitigation based on traffic flow and process reconfiguration strategies, 
respectively.  Chapter 7 presents simulation results. We conclude the thesis with Chapter 






Corporations have become increasingly aware of the importance of computer network 
security. Until recently, most companies concentrated only on making their network 
available to users at all times. Network security was seen as an unnecessary additional 
cost. The increased number of attacks and financial losses have forced corporations to 
take security seriously [16], [17], [18], [19]. 
Perfect security is widely acknowledged to be a myth [20]. Real world security is a 
system of trade-offs. Corporations try to make system intrusions more expensive for the 
attacker to execute than the attacker can expect to gain. At the same time, corporations 
must verify that their security expenditures are spent wisely, so that they minimize their 
own expected loss. To discuss current enterprise security, we present the following: 
1. Description of system stakeholders, the assets they need to protect, and the value 
of those assets. 
 
2. Taxonomy of potential attacks based on the approach used by the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) is given to describe and categorize system 
intrusions. In this context, it allows one to consider classes of attacks rather than 
individual instances. 
 
3. Attack trees are diagrams representing how the most likely, and potentially 
damaging, network intrusions could occur. Security auditors (red teams) 
commonly use attack trees to analyze infrastructure security. In the tree, an attack 
is decomposed into a sequence of and/or conditions. 
 
4. System penetration testing finds vulnerabilities in the current system. System 
penetration testing should be done on a test environment when the system is in 
production or development. Once the system is launched the penetration testing 
should be done at regular intervals to find new vulnerabilities and test for new 
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attacks. This includes performing an exhaustive test of data tampering attacks on 
user input fields. 
 
2.1. Background 
This section provides relevant background information on the users of a system, other 
key players involved, the assets that need to be protected. It is important to identify what 
each individual has at stake and the potential losses that can occur. It is also important to 
identify the attackers, their estimated gains from attacking a system, the potential 
vulnerabilities of a system and the entry point for an attack. To properly prioritize threats, 
it is important for an enterprise to realize, 
1. The users and the enterprise, 
2. Other key players involved, 
3. Assets that each player wants to protect, 
4. How the system is supposed to be used, 
5. The potential attackers of the system, 
6. The motivation of the attackers, and 
7. System vulnerabilities, 
8. Attack entry points. 
 




2.1.1 Assets to be protected with respect to Key Players 
The assets that need to be protected with respect to each player include 
1. Enterprise – needs to maintain the security of the system in a way that secures 
its intellectual property, reputation and freedom from liability litigation. It 
also needs to guarantee the correct functioning of the network to keep it 
available and guard against improper use of the applications. The duties 
include maintaining the traditional security attributes of confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, access control, and availability [4], 
[9]. 
 
2. Users – need to protect their personal data. The owner also wants to maintain 
their system in working order. Typically customers want to guard against the 
abuse of their user account. They are particularly sensitive to account abuse 
that violates their expectations of privacy and data integrity. Each customer 
needs to safeguard their authentication credentials from exposure to potential 
attackers. It is worth noting that the assumption that users adequately 
safeguard their private information is often the weak link in security plans. 
This is due both to the ease of constructing social engineering attacks [21] 
and the unfortunate fact that theft of personal data is frequently done by 
family or friends [22]. Recent better business bureau statistics even show 
47% of identity theft is performed by “friends, neighbors, in-home 
employees, family members, or relatives” [23]. 
 
3. Other players (partners, suppliers, vendors) - are interested in safeguarding 
themselves from liability litigation and maintaining their reputations. They 
also want to safeguard shared resources like network, information access to 
prevent potential legal liabilities.  
 
2.1.2. Attackers and their Motivation 
The attackers that will attack an enterprise typically belong to one or more of the 
following classes [4], [24], [25], 
1. Hackers – are typically individual computer users with technical literacy skills. 
Stereotypically, hackers are motivated by their interest in technology and the 
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intellectual challenge of overcoming security measures. Recent studies indicate 
that this type of computer abuse is waning. The profit motive seems to be the 
prime motivator in recent computer security incidents, which means that this class 
of attackers and the criminal class are becoming more difficult to differentiate. 
2. Corporate raiders – increasingly use technical means for performing industrial 
espionage. Industrial espionage may be limited to discovering trade secrets or 
may include sabotage to disrupt the services provided by a competitor. In many 
countries, the government and industry are intertwined, so that corporate 
espionage may be performed by the espionage services of nation states [26], [27]. 
This class of attackers typically has the most resources to invest in an attack. 
3. Criminals – have discovered a number of methods for making money dishonestly 
on-line. Criminal elements are involved in identity theft, spamming, and other 
fraudulent transactions. This may involve hijacking multiple machines using mal-
ware and coordinating their activities to form a “botnet.” There are many 
documented cases of botnets being used to create Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks as part of a protection racket. In many regions organized criminal 
gangs are actively involved in trafficking stolen luxury automobiles.  
4. Legitimate users – are likely to try to steal services of an enterprise. The theft of 
service attacks will occur, where legitimate users will try to access costly services 
without paying for them. A few disgruntled customers may also attempt to 
sabotage the services of an enterprise with a revenge motive. 
5. Enterprise corporate insiders – are very likely to abuse their system access rights. 
Disgruntled or bored workers may try to sabotage the network. Workers may also 
be bribed by criminals or competitors to commit unethical acts. Recent studies 
rank the insider threat as the second most prevalent source of computer crime 
[28], [29]. Since these users have legitimate access needs, and may even be in 
charge of enforcing security regulations, it is particularly difficult to guard the 
system against malicious insiders.  
These attackers have varying motivations from interest in computer systems to 
revenge for perceived wrongs to monetary gain. 
 
2.1.3. Attacks 
Attacks are rarely novel. In order to evaluate the security of an enterprise the classes 
of attacks that can be possible are discussed. Further the common attacks that can be 
hazardous to an enterprise are discussed in detail.   
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Figure 2 shows an attack incident taxonomy used by the Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) to describe security incidents [4], [24], [25].  This taxonomy 
provides a useful framework and uniform terminology for the discussion of security 
incidents.  In an incident, an attacker executes one or more attacks to achieve specific 
objectives. In each attack, tools are used to exploit vulnerabilities causing a series of 
events that produce an unauthorized result. Each individual event is a specific action 
undertaken against a target. Figure 2 is the canonical representation of this taxonomy. It 
presents a reasonably exhaustive listing of the members of each of these classes.  Figure 2 
can be narrowed down to include only those issues relevant to a particular enterprise and 











































































Figure 2.  Computer attack incident taxonomy from [24] used in [4, 24]. 
 
The very common attacks with respect on enterprise security are discussed in detail 
below. 
 
2.1.3.1 Input Exploitation attacks 
Buffer Overflow: A buffer overflow occurs when an application attempts to store more 
data in a memory buffer than has been allocated. In languages like C/C++, the overflow 
overwrites adjacent memory. This can cause the application or system to crash. Carefully 
crafted overflows can overwrite specific locations in memory; causing arbitrary code to 
execute and take over the machine. In strongly typed languages like Java, memory 
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management is handled differently and an array bound checking is part of the underlying 
language. Buffer overflow attacks are very unlikely to occur and much less severe for 
Java applications. For strongly typed languages, buffer overflows could possibly be used 
to create denial of service events. It may also be possible to trigger an error in the 
application, which may have unforeseen side effects if error handling routines are poorly 
implemented. The attacker can gain lots of information from error messages displayed in 
response to attempted buffer overflow attacks. This attack has several possible objectives, 
the most damaging ones are: 
1. To crash the server, 
2. To get control of the server, or  
3. To get control of the application. 
The system becomes vulnerable to such an attack when user input size is not properly 
validated in application code or in the software infrastructure. This attack could be 
detected before it occurs by finding inputs to data fields that are noticeably longer than 
typical inputs to the field. Vulnerability to this attack is frequently signaled in advance by 
a piece of software crashing unexpectedly due to segmentation faults. Several methods 
exist for preventing these attacks, including: 
1. Proper coding practices,  
2. Frequent code reviews, 
3. Extensive software testing,  
4. Vigilant system administration that applies the most recent patches to the 
operating system and software infrastructure, 
 




6. Static code verification using tools, or 
7. Implement a data input monitoring task that tracks the input lengths of data fields 
and signals when field length is an outlier exceeding the normally experienced 
field length variance. 
8.  Implement a code verification tool that automatically checks code written in 
vulnerable languages to verify that adequate data size verifications are in place. 
These special safeguards will be of limited utility against buffer overflow attacks on 
the operating system or commercial software infrastructure. For those components, the 
buffer overflow attack is likely to succeed and damage the system before the data input 
monitoring could be executed. Use of the code verification tool would be possible only 
on open source components. For Java applications, it would suffice to perform 
penetration testing to see that unreasonably long inputs do not disturb the application. 
Buffer Underflow: Buffer Underflow refers to null values given as input in the input 
data fields. In buffer underflow there are two distinct issues with a common cause: 
1. A temporal problem caused by producer consumer patterns when the buffer 
becomes empty. This occurs when the producer stalls. This may be 
problematic for some systems. The classic example is CD/DVD burning 
where the laser cannot stop instantaneously. 
 
2. A parsing problem when a data input field is empty. 
The likely negative effects of this attack are: 
1. For the temporal problem, a deadlock or similar problem may arise leading to 
a degradation or denial of service. 
 
2. For both problems data corruption is possible. 
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The system becomes vulnerable to such an attack when software design or 
implementation does not consider the affects of null buffer lengths. This attack is 
signaled by the presence of empty data fields. Several methods exist for preventing these 
attacks, like formal protocol analysis to guard against deadlocks, livelocks and related 
problems. Another solution would be to perform penetration testing on the application. A 
PERL filter that exhaustively tests for the consequences of entering empty data fields can 
be used to accomplish penetration testing. 
Special Character Attack: In the unexpected operator attack, carefully crafted input is 
sent to an application. This input has special characters in it that can cause the application 
to execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability can be exploited by appending the input with 
special characters. Prepending file names with file system navigation commands, like 
“../” can be used to trick the system into modifying system files. The “;” operator can be 
used to trick database applications into passing commands directly to an operator 
command shell. Wildcard operators, like “*” may result in a clever user circumventing 
security checks. Cross-site scripting (XSS) is one particularly virulent example, where 
users surreptitiously insert executable content into a data store. If done correctly, the XSS 
attack can result in customers executing arbitrary malicious code. Note that this 
vulnerability can occur whenever user supplied data is ever displayed or parsed. The 
likely negative effects of this attack are: 
1. Execution of arbitrary code on the host, 
2. Unintentional disclosure of data and violation of confidentiality, 
3. Session hijacking, 
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4. Corruption of system files, or 
5. Circumvention of security checks. 
A system becomes vulnerable to such an attack when several symbols have special 
meanings for specific software components. Carefully crafting sequences of inputs can 
result in innocuous sequences of symbols being transformed into harmful instructions. 
This attack is signaled by the presence of specific symbols in data streams. Several 
prevention techniques exist, including: 
1. XSS is often foiled by translating symbols into equivalent representations that are 
not recognized as special symbols, 
 
2. Searching for special symbols and removing them totally from input streams, and 
 
3. Perform extensive penetration testing. This can be achieved by creating a PERL 
filter that exhaustively tests for the consequences of inserting special characters 
into input messages. 
 
It is worth noting that legitimate uses exist for these symbols, so that the first two 
solutions may either break existing applications or needlessly interfere with the 
implementation of legitimate applications. 
 
2.1.3.2 Code Insertion attacks 
Many modern applications are built by interfacing multiple components. Typical user 
actions pass through an IP stack, an XML parser, a web server, and a database engine. 
The request is interpreted and acted on by each of these software systems. In code 
insertion attacks, the attacker takes a normal system request and adds malicious 
instructions that speak directly to a specific software system. These attacks are quite 
common and potentially disastrous.  
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Script Code Insertion: Script code insertion is typically referred to as cross-site 
scripting. In the typical scenario, an application requests input from users that can be 
provided to other users. If a user provides content that includes scripting commands, this 
can result in the script executing on any host that attempts to display the web page in the 
future. This approach is frequently used to hijack sessions. This attack can result in: 
1. Session hijacking,  
2. Loss of data confidentiality, and 
3. Execution of arbitrary code on other clients. 
This attack can be successful when an application allows users to modify system data. 
Care needs to be taken to examine all data that comes from untrusted sources and disable 
any portion of the content that could be interpreted as scripting commands. This attack is 
signaled by the presence of meta-characters in user inputs. This attack can be prevented 
by not allowing content to be modified by untrusted parties. If the application requires 
this ability, user inputs need to be carefully parsed to check for executable content. This 
content needs to be disabled. This is done by translating meta-characters that signal the 
presence of script commands into equivalent encodings that are not executable. 
LDAP Code Insertion: The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a 
simplified variant of the X.500 ITU directory standard. As a technology for retrieving 
hierarchically stored data, it is in some ways a competitor with SQL. As with SQL, it is 
vulnerable to injection attacks. If the application uses user inputs to manufacture a query, 
it may be possible for a malicious user to cleverly manufacture inputs that radically 
modify the request. This attack can result in: 
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1. Disclosure of data,  
2. Corruption of the LDAP data, and 
3. Modification of LDAP directory. 
A system becomes vulnerable to such an attack when user inputs are used by an 
application to construct LDAP queries. This attack is typically signaled by the presence 
of meta-characters in user inputs used to construct LDAP queries. 
 This attack can be prevented by not relying on user inputs to construct LDAP 
queries. If the application design should require that sort of flexibility, user inputs need to 
be parsed carefully. In particular, the characters “(”, “*”, and “||” should be handled with 
care. If it would be possible to design the system to not allow these characters in user 
inputs, that would be desirable. The verification of user inputs should be done on the 
host, as modifications of queries through data tampering is possible at many points on the 
vehicle/client. It is also highly advisable to implement the LDAP directory using the 
principle of least privilege. All client accounts should be constrained to have minimal 
access rights. Alternatively, user inputs need to be carefully parsed and the presence of 
potentially damaging requests detected. Extensive penetration testing is required. 
SQL Code Insertion: The structured query language (SQL) is the standard interface 
language for interactions with relational databases. Most SQL implementations also 
include escape characters that allow a query to include commands that are passed directly 
to the operating system command interpreter (shell). Once an attacker has gained access 
with the aid of other attacks the attacker can embed crafted SQL commands in the input 
requests to gain information about other accounts, personal user information, proprietary 
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information etc. All the attacker has to do is find the parameter the application server 
passes to the database. This attack can result in: 
1. Disclosure of data,  
2. Execution of arbitrary shell commands on the server, 
3. Corruption of the SQL database, and 
4. Modification of the database. 
The vulnerability to such an attack exists when user inputs are used by an application 
to construct SQL queries. This attack is typically signaled by the presence of meta-
characters in user inputs used to construct queries, but other techniques exist for 
constructing malicious queries. This attack can be prevented by using the same 
techniques as in LDAP code insertion (2.1.3.4.2). Apart from these techniques escape 
characters including quotes, dollar signs, and semicolons should be handled with care. 
Since SQL is not strongly typed, the attack can also use the contents of variables to 
construct attacks. User inputs should not be used to construct SQL queries. Alternatively, 
user inputs need to be carefully parsed and the presence of potentially damaging requests 
detected. Extensive penetration testing is required. 
 
2.1.3.3 Platform attacks   
This subsection (2.1.3.3) cover attacks directed at the platform, which includes all 
non-application specific components, including operating systems, standard libraries, 
web servers, databases, and other off-the-shelf components. Because these components 
are often well-known and widely-used tools, they present special security concerns. 
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These tools are likely to be more secure than custom coded components due to the 
scrutiny that these products receive from their large user-base. However, any platform 
vulnerabilities that are discovered are published, and in most cases, a software revision 
(i.e. patch) is made available soon after. If patches are not promptly installed, the system 
becomes vulnerable to well-known attacks. Unfortunately, new patches also introduce 
new functionality and security bugs, and some level of testing or redundancy is advised.   
We first cover the pre-attack phase of probing and scanning, which is used to identify 
information about the system and the various platforms that it uses.  These are not attacks 
but methods by which an attacker can gain information about the system.   
Port Scanning and Probing - Port scanning is used to find open network ports, which 
correspond to server applications that support network access.  There are various port 
scanning utilities that are readily available (e.g. nmap, ping, trace analyzers).Once the 
open ports are determined, an attacker can send various requests probing for information 
(e.g. the version of the web server).  Probing refers to examining a host and testing its 
responses. In Probing attacks an attacker scans a network of computers to gather 
information or find known vulnerabilities.  A probe attack involves an automated 
program that scans a host's ports, looking for running services that respond to queries. 
These probes can be anything like invalid credentials, invalid requests, junk packets. The 
attacker then attempts to exploit weaknesses in responding services. The server would 
send error messages in response to these invalid requests. Though the attacker does not 
gain access to the server these error messages can equip the attacker with vital 
information. This is the very first thing an attacker will do when he is about to attack. A 
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successful probing attack will inform the hacker about vulnerabilities in the network 
which he can use to stage hazardous attacks like DoS, Buffer Overflow etc. A probing 
attack generally does not harm a system directly; it just leads to compromise of valuable 
information that can be misused later.   
Tracing/Analyzing and Eavesdropping - There are various trace analyzers that can 
trace and analyze connections. Though the payload is encrypted, other information like 
the IP address and port number are not. Analyzing such traces can also provide 
information to the attacker. Like probing and scanning, trace analysis can also provide 
the attacker with information like product type and versions. The attacker can then search 
for known vulnerabilities and try to attack the server.  Unlike probing and scanning, 
tracing can be done passively (i.e. eavesdropping), so that it is undetectable.  
The objective of such an attack would be to gain platform information about the 
system, such as product versions and configurations, for the purpose of finding attack 
points and vulnerabilities. Any information that can be extracted from invalid requests or 
unencrypted data presents a vulnerability for collecting data, including addresses, port 
numbers, response headers, protocols, and error messages.  To prevent such attacks some 
of the information sources can be removed (e.g. unnecessary open ports), but not all 
useful information can be removed (e.g. the destination address can not be hidden, and 
hiding the web server version can be difficult). Error messages with information about 
the system should not be sent back to the host. The user and the client application do not 
need to know about the details of system errors, and so only user level descriptions 
should be sent over the connection. Also messages sent must be encrypted. This prevents 
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passive eavesdropping. Client side eavesdropping (after encryption) is prevented through 
tamper resistant packaging. 
This attack should be addressed through encryption and client-side security measures.  
System security should not rely on the secrecy of information that can be acquired 
through eavesdropping. 
This part of the subsection (2.1.3.3) continues coverage of attacks directed at the 
platform-level, including all non-application specific components.  The server 
components can be attacked using various forms of input exploitation.  More specifically, 
platform attacks are very likely because attacks on these products are widely known and 
available.  The Web server, Application server, database and Identity store can be 
attacked by using known vulnerabilities like buffer overflow, misconfiguration (access 
rights), and other known exploits.   
Unknown Exploit: This attack considers the special case of buffer overflow in the 
platform components.  Buffer overflows of platform components can be further divided 
into known exploits and new exploits.  Known exploits will be covered in the next 
subsection and the current attack will focus on new exploits.  While known buffer 
overflow have a better chance of being detected, new buffer overflow exploits will be 
difficult to detect. As with any buffer overflow attack, this attack has several possible 
objectives, the most damaging ones are: 
1. To crash the server, 
2. To get control of the server, or 
3. To get control of the application. 
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By gaining control of a platform component, access control and any application 
security measures can be circumvented by the attacker. The system becomes vulnerable 
to such an attack when user input size not properly validated in application code or in the 
software infrastructure. Unlike application specific code, buffer overflows can not be 
prevented at the source, because the source code for platform components are not under 
the control of an enterprise. Platform buffer overflows must be prevented using external 
input validation and patching – in cases where the supplier has removed a buffer 
overflow vulnerability.  Since this attack is focusing on unknown exploits, input anomaly 
detection or post-attack-detection are the only options. This attack could be detected 
before it occurs by finding inputs to data fields that are noticeably longer than typical 
inputs to the field. Vulnerability to this attack is frequently signaled in advance by a piece 
of software crashing unexpectedly due to segmentation faults. Another solution would be 
to filter unexpected packets through stateful monitoring. 
Known Exploit: This attack considers known attacks on platform components that have 
been published and either patched or otherwise handled by commercial tools. Known 
exploits can have several possible objectives, the most damaging ones are: 
1. To crash the server, 
2. To get control of the server, or 
3. To get control of the application. 
By gaining control of a platform component, access controls and any application 
security measures can be circumvented by the attacker. A system becomes vulnerable to 
such an attack if user input size not properly validated in application code or in the 
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software infrastructure. Known exploits can be detected using signature-based 
identification in IDS/antivirus/firewall products. Known exploits can be prevented using 
signature-based identification or patching by the product provider. Also an Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS) can be deployed to detect and drop known exploits (prior to 
patch release).  Signatures and patches must be kept up to date. 
Misconfiguration: Just as harmful as a known exploit, misconfiguring a component can 
render the entire system defenseless.  A trivial example would be leaving the default 
administrator account and password set. Misconfiguration can be difficult to detect 
through monitoring, but many commercial tools will actively check for common 
misconfigurations.  There are also configuration guides for specific products that provide 
either a secure configuration or a checklist for creating one. 
Abuse of Error Logs and Audit data: This final platform-level category covers a single 
attack, abuse of data from error logs and audit logs. An Attacker can gain information on 
user accounts and system details from the error log data and the audit data. The error log 
data of the application server has a log of all the successful authentications and failures. 
Gaining access to this log can give away vital information of the system and personal 
user information. This needs to be very well protected. Similarly the audit data of the 
database also has vital information that needs to be protected. Unauthorized access to 
these logs and audit data can be gained by changing permissions (broken access control), 
Input exploitation etc. The attacker can be on the company intranet with a few rights. 
This attacker can change or elevate his permissions in order to view the logs or the audit 
data.  Additionally, an attacker can modify audit logs and error logs to hide his or her 
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attack or actions.  The objective of such an attack would be to gain access to logs and 
audit data for the purpose of reading the data or modifying the data. A system will be 
vulnerable to such an attack if file permissions are not set correctly. Also if a system is 
vulnerable user input exploitation, an attacker can use that vulnerability to get access to 
error logs and audit logs. This attack can be detected by checking the log files for 
unauthorized user access. Access to the logs and audit data can be prevented by strict 
input validation, restricted file permissions and mandatory access controls. For Linux 
platform, SE-Linux security module should be used with mandatory access control to 
prevent unauthorized access.  To prevent modification, a duplicate real-time copy of the 
log should be maintained (e.g. using a virtual printer). 
 
2.1.3.4 Session ID Attacks  
Session ID attacks allow intruders to access a system by circumventing the 
authentication process. The attacks discussed here are application level attacks. Similar 
problems exist at the network and host levels [30]. Network layer session hijacking 
attacks include the man-in-the-middle attack (where attackers insert themselves as 
transducers between client and server), and packet injection attacks (where spoofed 
packets replace legitimate packets in a TCP session). Host level attacks are possible by 
using port forwarding, for example. It is also possible to subvert the network DNS 
directory system, so that attempts to access a server are redirected. To avoid these 




Brute force: Session ID’s are used to identify legitimate sessions. For web applications, 
since the HTTP protocol is stateless, a “magic cookie” is often used to store the session 
ID. The value stored in this cookie uniquely identifies the user’s session to the web 
server. This allows a user to log in to the service and their authentication credentials are 
associated with the magic cookie on the web server.  
If the session ID is not generated randomly from a sufficiently large range of values, 
it becomes possible for an attacker to predict future values of the “magic cookie” with a 
non-trivial likelihood of success. This means that an attacker can calculate a session ID 
using brute force, attach to the server, and quite possibly be able to use the system by 
masquerading as a valid user with an active session. This is done by an attacker that has 
never had any contact (direct or indirect) with the poor victim, whose account is probably 
being charge for the intruder’s actions. 
Copy Session ID: In the copy session ID attack, the intruder manages to steal the session 
ID from a valid active session. One way to steal the session ID is by staging a successful 
cross-site-scripting (XSS) attack. The script finds a channel for transmitting the session 
ID to the attacker. This attack can result in session hijacking which allows the intruder to 
circumvent the authentication process. This attack is successful when the intruder 
succeeds in accessing the session ID credentials of a legitimate user. For most web 
applications, no additional credentials checking are performed. The session ID can be 
compromised through sniffing. Since the intruder possesses legitimate credentials, that 
data item is not a reasonable signature for attack detection. Should the user sessions 
follow a typical sequence of activities, such as accessing a tree structure of options 
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menus, it should be possible to detect sequences of commands that either violate the 
system structure, or are highly unlikely. This concept directly contradicts the stateless 
nature of IP, which would make use of this approach very problematic. Keeping session 
ID credentials private can prevent this attack. Alternatively, additional authentication 
checking could be performed. For example, using the current IP address of the client as 
an additional credential could be effective. Also, formal analysis of the protocol used to 
set up session IDs can be done. Penetration testing of the system to see how feasible it is 
to find session IDs should be done. 
 
2.1.4 Attack Trees 
Attack trees provide a formal, methodical way of describing the security of systems, 
based on varying attacks. Basically, you represent attacks against a system in a tree 
structure, with the goal as the root node and different ways of achieving that goal as leaf 
nodes [31]. Figure 3 shows an example of an attack tree to attack the database. The root 
of the tree is the goal of the attacker. The root has sub trees that have leaves and so on. 
The last leaf nodes denotes the information that the attacker starts with to achieve is final 
goal i.e. root. Simple arrows represent the ‘OR’ condition i.e. alternatives. If the arrows 
are grouped together, it means an ‘AND’ i.e. the attacker requires all the conditions that 








Figure 3.  Attack tree to attack the Database. 
 
Security auditors (red teams) commonly use attack trees to analyze infrastructure 
security. They start eliminating the last leaf nodes by using preventive techniques. For 
e.g. to eliminate a node that says Port Scanning, an auditor would have to see if there any 
open ports and then close any unused open ports.  If the auditors are able to cut off all 
these last leaf nodes, they can conclude that the attacker will never be able to reach the 
root of the tree. Figure 4 is another example of an attack tree to attack the Web 
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BACKGROUND ON DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS AND EXISTING 
MITIGATION TECHNIQUES  
 
3.1 Denial-of-Service and Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks  
A DoS attack is an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate users of a 
service from using that service [10]. DoS attacks are perpetrated either locally or over the 
network. On a multi-user system, any user consuming an inordinate amount of resources 
launches a simple DoS attack on other users. This is stopped by attentive system 
maintenance. Sabotaging equipment is another simple DoS attack; countered by 
physically protecting devices. Remote DoS attacks using the Internet are of primary 
interest. 
DoS attacks can be classified as system exploit attacks and network attacks [4]. 
System exploit attacks exploit security vulnerabilities specific to the system. These can 
cause a server or service to crash or significantly reduce performance. Example of this 
attack would be the famous Ping of death exploit where a ping packet (echo request 
datagram) with more than 65,507 octets of data is sent to a machine. This malformed 
ping packet results in the crashing of a computer [32].  
Networking attacks take advantage of vagueness or weakness in protocol 
specifications. Known Internet DoS exploits include: attacks on root Internet name 
servers, attacks on merchant and media sites, and the Slammer worm [4]. The network 
traffic generated by Slammer triggered DoS events for other systems. 
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Most networking attacks flood the network with spurious traffic to block legitimate 
traffic. In the case of SYN floods, the attacker fills the buffer for the TCP connections by 
sending multiple connection requests. In some earlier operating system version’s the size 
of the buffer was too small and could easily be filled [33]. More brute force attacks are 
also possible, where a large volume of packets fills all of the available bandwidth. Packet 
queues fill on intermediate machines and legitimate packets get dropped. Packet dropping 
forces TCP to retransmit packets while flow control slows the packet throughput rate. 
The network is then unusable for its intended purpose. 
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a networked DoS where nodes work 
together. A typical DDoS attack contains three stages as shown in Figure 1. It follows a 
hierarchical model, with one or more attackers controlling a handler, which in turn 
controls the hordes of zombies that execute the commands relayed to them [34].  
The first stage is the communication between the attacker and his handler. In the 
second stage the attacker gains access to multiple machines over time and plants zombie 
processes i.e. installs attack tools in these compromised systems via the handlers [35]. 
This way the computers are turned into zombies. In the third stage, the attacker sends an 
attack command to the handlers which in turn relay this message to the zombies through 
a secure channel to launch an attack against the victim [34]. The communication between 
the attacker and the handler, and between the handler and the agents is referred to as the 
control traffic of the network, whereas the communication between the agents and the 
victims is referred to as the flood traffic.  
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A zombie is a daemon that performs the actual attack [36]. On receiving the attack 
command the zombies, located on different computers, launch the attack on the target. 
The random nodes send replies to the target. Hundreds or thousands of zombies working 
together swamp the bandwidth of the target’s network connections. In the recent DDoS 
attack on Estonia, reports claim that there were more that about 1 million ‘zombies’ were 
compromised to launch the DDoS attack [1]. A DDoS attack is difficult (or almost 
impossible) to avoid. The attacker does not need to access any machine on the same sub 
network as the target. It is currently impossible to enforce stringent security on all the 
Internet Autonomous Systems (AS’s). 
 
3.2 Related Work in Mitigation of Distributed Denial of Service 
The complex nature of the DDoS attacks makes it very difficult to prevent. Most of 
the culprits involved in the DDoS attacks are never caught as the attackers can spoof their 
identity in order to make it harder for the target of the source to identify the root of the 
attack [13]. In order to remove himself from view, the attacker introduces additional 
layers between the victim host(s) and him/herself [34]. Also there is a lack of detailed 
information of the attack. A lot of time and money is spent on the analysis of the DDoS 
attacks. By the time the analysis is over, the attackers have found other ways of executing 
DDoS attacks.  
The seriousness of the DDoS problem and increase in the frequency over the past few 
years have led to the proposal of numerous defense mechanisms. In [3] the authors 
classify defense techniques as either preventive or reactive. Preventive techniques 
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identify loopholes in current systems or protocols and correct them. Preventive 
techniques cannot guarantee that systems and protocols are 100% secure, but they can 
reduce the prevalence and consequences of DDoS attacks.  
Reactive techniques try to detect attacks quickly and respond. It is important that 
reactive technologies have low false negative rates. Reacting to falsely perceived DDoS 
attacks can have consequences just as bad as the DDoS attacks themselves.  
In [37] the authors classify the defense techniques in another way as either fair 
resource allocation or filtering / rate-limiting techniques.  
Fair resource allocation that is preventive in nature quantifies the resources available 
at the server and distributes them fairly among all the clients. Resource allocation can use 
Quality of Service (QoS) techniques like Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ), class-based 
WFQ etc [38], [8]. A related approach [39] views DDoS attacks as a resource 
management problem. This assumes that servers are close to the backbone network with 
high capacity pipes and see the full force of the attack traffic that has gone through 
aggregation inside the network. So before the aggressive packets can converge to attack 
or disturb a server the routers along the forwarding path regulates the traffic, thus 
avoiding an impending attack.  
Preventive techniques prevent high-rate DDoS attacks but sometimes also affect 
legitimate traffic. It is very difficult to distinguish a DDoS attack from a flash event [2], 
[40]. A flash event occurs when large amounts of expected or unexpected traffic from 
legitimate clients suddenly arrive at a system. This is also called the “Slash-Dot Effect,” 
 
 34 
For example; a new car model website might have increased traffic on the day it is 
announced. Preventive techniques affect legitimate traffic in two ways,  
1. Since these techniques cannot distinguish between attack and legitimate traffic, 
legitimate traffic will be throttled along with attack traffic. 
 
2. Since these techniques are unable to detect flash events, they might have to 
excessive false positive rates. 
  
Reactive filtering and rate-limiting defenses are attack-specific. They first identify 
attack traffic and then use filters to remove the attack traffic [15]. There are only two 
ways to identify the source of the attack packet, the source IP address or IP header values 
[41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46]. Unfortunately, the way the IP protocol is implemented 
these values can be easily spoofed. To prevent IP spoofing, some administrators use 
ingress and egress filtering [47]. Since ingress and egress filtering is not used by all the 
end point routers, its use is not very effective. Attacker spoofing of IP addresses on the 
same subnet can also negate ingress and egress filtering. Packet filtering is typically 
ineffective if attack traffic cannot be identified.  
There are other methods like [48] where the destination must give permission to the 
sender before packets are sent. These techniques have excessive overhead, cause 
unnecessary delays, and still can not prevent IP spoofing.  
Some detection techniques [49], [50] use trace-back to find the routers and links used 
in attacks. The origin of a flood attack can be found, but the attack will not be stopped 
immediately. These trace-back approaches also require excessive overhead. Trace-back is 
effective for detecting a single attack source, but will be ineffective for DDoS attacks. As 
the number of attack sources increase, trace-back becomes increasingly difficult [49]. 
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Surveys [2], [40] and [51] classify existing DoS defense techniques. [2], [40] 
conclude that none of the techniques address real-world concerns. The authors doubt the 
robustness of DDoS detection approaches and suggest relying on network administrators 
to manually detect DDoS attacks. 
The approach we present builds robust networks that tolerate DDoS attacks. On a 
given network, we determine the resources an attacker needs to stage a DDoS attack. This 
gives direct insight into the network vulnerabilities that make DDoS attacks possible. 
This information can be used in turn to make the networks less susceptible to attack. In a 
similar approach [52] Blue tries to restrict the attacker’s network use by solving the bi-
objective maximum-flow network-interdiction (BMXFI) using Lagrangian relaxation to 
reduce the time complexity of the problem. In this thesis we use concepts of 






DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE MODEL 
 
4.1 Problem Statement for DDoS Games 
The idea presented here is based on the work in [4] that finds the complexity of 
optimal DDoS attack design for a given graph and distributed application. In this work 
we describe a two player game played on a physical graph. A computer network is 
modeled by a directed physical graph structure in which computers are graph nodes and 
links connecting computers are graph arcs. 
 
4.1.1 Physical Environment 
The Physical environment (computer network) is represented by a directed graph 
structure (EG). This computer network consists of N nodes. As an illustrative example, 
we will discuss a model of a real computer with about 500 nodes connected by about 
1500 arcs. EG is represented by: 
 
      ],[ EEEVEG =                                                      (4.1)                                                                                        
 
where EV is the set of vertices or nodes (computers) and EE a set of directed edges or 
links.  
Each element of EV has an associated capacity value representing its processing 
power. This is represented as a vector.  
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Each element of EE has an associated capacity value representing the link’s 
communications bandwidth available. EE’s connectivity matrix describes connections 
between network nodes. EE’s capacities are represented by a square connectivity matrix 
of the order (N × N) where each element is either the capacity over the edge or is a 0 if 
there is no link connecting two nodes. Nodes do not communicate with themselves over 
the network i.e. in the connectivity matrix the edges (1,1), (2,2), (3,3)…….(N, N) will 
always be zero (the diagonal of EG’s connectivity matrix will always be zero). The local 
communications bandwidth on each node is considered infinite. 
 
4.1.2 Blue (Virtual) Environment 
The Virtual (Blue) environment is a distributed application comprising of the 
distributed programs. For the successful execution of this distributed application within 
the network, the distributed programs placed on the physical nodes of EG must be able to 
communicate with each other at all times. This environment is represented by a “logical” 
directed graph structure (BG). One or more programs can run on the same computer. The 
Blue Environment consists of M blue nodes. BG is represented by: 
 
],[ BEBVBG =                                             (4.2) 
 




The capacity for each element of BV is the amount of CPU load it can provide. BV’s 
capacities are given as a vector. 
 The capacity for BE represents communication requirements. Connectivity matrix 
BE describes connections between nodes in the network. BE’s capacities are represented 
by a square (M × M) connectivity matrix where each element is either the capacity 
required over the edge or 0 if no link connects two nodes. Nodes do not communicate 
with themselves over the network i.e. in the connectivity matrix the edges (1,1), (2,2), 
(3,3)…….(M, M) are always zero (the diagonal of BG’s connectivity matrix is always 
zero). The local bandwidth on each node is considered infinite.  
The two players are:  
1. Player 1: Player 1 is a distributed application on the network denoted by the color 
Blue. A set of programs consume CPU resources on “physical” nodes. For each 
pair of programs, there is a known communications bandwidth requirement. 
These constraints define a “logical” graph. The set of “feasible configurations” is 
the set of mappings of logical nodes to physical nodes, where the logical graph’s 
CPU and communications needs are satisfied by the physical graph. 
 
2. Player 2: Player 2 is an attacker that is denoted by the color Red. Red places 
zombie programs on the physical nodes. These processes can send network traffic 
over the physical edges to consume network resources. If the Red zombies 
consume enough communications bandwidth to make the physical graph unable 
to satisfy one of the logical graph’s constraints, Blue’s configuration is disabled. 
His aim is to disrupt the functioning of blue in two ways,  
a. Exhaust Node Capacities: Disrupt the ability of a distributed program 
placed on the physical node of EG by exhausting CPU load and 
b. Exhaust Arc Capacities: Disrupt the ability of a distributed program to 
communicate with another distributed program 
 
The aim of our work is to find the connectivity bottlenecks and vulnerable nodes that 
are absolutely necessary for the Blue network to stay connected. Further we find the 
minimum number of zombies and the minimal amount of flow required to attack 
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bottleneck links and vulnerable nodes.  By analyzing the strategies of the two players, 
conclusions are drawn about the conditions necessary to successfully stage a DDoS 
attack. Our results show a strong relationship between the connectivity of the graph and 
the ability of individual network members to resist DDoS attacks. The results obtained 
can be used to design robust networks. 
 
4.2 Key Concepts 
Graph Theory: In this section, some of the concepts of graph theory [5] used are 
explained.  
Graph: A graph is a graphical representation of a network, where the nodes of the graph 
are hosts or computers and the arcs of the graphs are the links connecting the computers. 
Directed Graphs: A directed graph is a network whose elements are ordered pairs of 
nodes. If two nodes A and B are connected by a single directed arc (A B), this does not 
mean that node B is also connected to node A. Flow can be sent from Node A  B but not 
visa versa. These graphs have nodes and arcs with associated numerical values (like 
costs, capacities, etc).  
Connectivity: Two nodes A and B are connected if the graph contains at least one path 
from node A to node B [5]. A graph is connected if every pair of its nodes is connected. 
Adjacency Matrix: This matrix stores the network in the form of a ‘N × N’ matrix that 
gives the connectivity between all the ‘N’ nodes of the network. The matrix has a row 
and column corresponding to every node. If the arc between two nodes A and B exists (A 
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 B), the value or capacity or simply 1 is written in the A
th
 row and B
th
 column else a 0 
is written.  
Source Node:  The node that is the starting point for a flow is called a source node. 
Sink Node:  The node in which a flow terminates is the sink node. 
A flow must satisfy the restriction that the amount of flow into a node equals the 
amount of flow out of it, except when it is a source, which has more outgoing flow, or 
sink, which has more incoming flow. For more information on graph theory see [5].   
Max-Flow: In a network graph, the max-flow is the maximum possible flow that one can 
route from one node (source) to another (sink) [5]. For the physical network EG we 
calculate the max-flow from N sources to N sinks. The max-flow from node j to node k, 
determines the logical link capacity available to Blue nodes (programs) placed on 
physical nodes (computers) j and k. Many techniques can be used to find the max-flow, 
we use the Highest Label Preflow Push Algorithm [5]. It has the lowest running time in 
practice - O(n
2
m) [5]. Consider our example application which requires calculating the 
max-flow from 10,000 sources to 10,000 sinks. 
Min-cut: The min-cut is the smallest set of edges or arcs that is absolutely necessary for a 
source to communicate to a sink. The removal of these edges from the network graph 
completely disconnects the source node from a sink node. Blue must safeguard these arcs 
to maintain connectivity over the network.  
To illustrate the concepts of max-flow and min-cut, we find let us calculate the max-
flow and min-cut from source node 1 to sink node 6 in Figure 5. There are two paths 
from node 1 to the node 6. The first path is (1-2-4-6) and the second path is (1-3-5-6). 
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The maximum flow over (1-2-4-6) is bounded by arc (1-2) which has capacity 2. The 
second path (1-3-5-6) is bounded by arc (5-6) with capacity 2. Since each of the only two 
paths from 1 to 6 has capacity two, and the two paths are disjoint, the max-flow from 1-6 
is their sum (4). The min-cut is the smallest number of edges with minimum capacity 
whose removal will disconnect the source from the sink. In Figure 5, arc (1-2) is the 
minimum capacity arc in path (1-2-4-6), and arc (5-6) is the minimum capacity arc in 
path (1-3-5-6). Removing these two arcs disconnects node 1 from node 6. So the min-cut 









Figure 5.  Max-flow and min-cut for a directed graph structure. 
 
Note that “The maximal amount of flow is equal to the capacity of a minimal cut”, 















DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE MITIGATION  
APPROACH – TRAFFIC FLOW 
 
In this section we first define the goal of each player followed by the strategies each 
player uses to either win the game or maximize their expected payoff.  
 
5.1 Player 1 - Blue 
Player 1 (Blue) is a distributed application on the network. This distributed 
application consists of programs executing on physical nodes. The distributed programs 
consume CPU resources on the local physical node. Each pair of programs has a known 
communications bandwidth requirement.   These programs must communicate with each 
other in order to execute successfully. We first determine the possible positions 
(computers) where Blue programs can reside. This gives us a set of “feasible Blue 
configurations” that is the set of mappings of logical nodes to physical nodes, where the 
logical graph’s CPU and communications needs are satisfied by the physical graph. 
Aim of Player Blue:  
1. To ensure that the Blue - distributed programs remain connected at all times. 
 
2. If a particular Blue configuration is attacked, Blue switches to another available 
Blue configuration from the set of Blue configurations to a configuration that Red 
cannot attack or is less affected by the Red attack. 
 
3. Blue tries to find a “loopy” [7] game where it can always return to a previous 
configuration. A detailed explanation on loopy games is given in section 6.1.1. 
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Strategy: Blue first finds the set of possible Blue configurations. Blue can then 
reconfigure by moving to another Blue configuration once attacked. To find the set of 
feasible configurations for Blue i.e. the set of mappings of BV (distributed program – 
logical graph) onto EV (physical graph) Blue has to satisfy two classes of constraints: 
1. Node Capacity Constraints 
2. Edge Capacity Constraints 
 
5.1.1 Node Capacity Constraints 
Statement: The sum of the CPU requirements for the set of nodes from BV assigned to 
each element of EV is less than or equal to the CPU bandwidth of that element. 
A blue node can be placed on a physical node whose node capacity (processing 
power) is greater than or equal to the node capacity (CPU load) of the blue node. More 
than one blue node can be placed on the same physical node provided that the sum of all 
the nodal capacities of the blue nodes placed on the single physical node are less than or 
equal to the capacity of the single physical nodes. This can be represented as: 
 
Blue of Capacity Nodal  Node Physical a of Capacity Nodal ≥             (5.1) 
 
For e.g. consider an example shown in Figure 6 where there are six physical nodes 
with a nodal capacity, EV = [5, 2, 1, 3, 1, 2] and two blue nodes with a nodal capacity, BV 











Figure 6.  Node Capacity Constraints. 
 
Blue node A can be placed individually on the physical nodes 1, 4 and 5 and Blue node 
B can be individually placed on any physical node. Blue nodes A and B together can be 
placed only on node 1, as CPU capacity requirement of A and B together is 3 + 1 = 4 and 
this value is less than the CPU requirement of available CPU capacity at physical node 1 
which is 5. The available communication capacities between these two Blue nodes placed 
on 1 becomes infinite as they are on the same node and do not require any 
communication bandwidth to remain connected. In the same figure, Blue nodes A and B 
together cannot be placed on physical node 4 as the available capacity requirement of 
physical node 4 which is 3. Though node A and node B individually can be placed on 4, 
since the CPU capacity of node A is 3 and node B is 1 which are both less than the 
available CPU capacity of physical node 4. Once we have satisfied the nodal capacity 















CPU Load = 3
CPU Load = 1
CPU Load = 5
CPU Load = 3
Both A and B together can be placed on 1 but not on 4
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5.1.2 Edge Capacity Constraints 
Statement: For each element beij of BE connecting two elements of BV (bvi and bvj), 
where bvi (bvj) is mapped to pvi (pvj) the max-flow [5] on EG from pvi to pvj must be 
greater than equal to the bandwidth requirement of bvij. If pvi and pvj are on the same 
node, the value of the max-flow is infinite. 
Two blue nodes can be placed on two different physical nodes if the arc/edge capacity 
(computational and communication requirement) between the two blue nodes is less than 
or equal to the arc capacity (bandwidth) of the two physical nodes. So this check can be 
represented by: 
 
Nodes Blue two ofCapacity  Arc  Nodes Physical two between Flow-Max ≥    (5.2)          
 
If two blue nodes are placed on the same physical node i.e. they satisfy the nodal 
capacity constraints then we do not have to check for the arc capacity constraint as two 
blue nodes on the same physical node have infinite communication bandwidth available. 
This is illustrated in Figure 6.  
To satisfy the communication requirements between two Blue nodes placed on 
different physical nodes we need to determine the maximum bandwidth available 
between two physical nodes. To determine this maximum available bandwidth between 
any two nodes we calculate the max-flow [5] which gives us the maximum available 
bandwidth. A blue node may satisfy the constraints of many physical nodes. So we will 
have a number of possibilities. We will thus get a set of lists of possible Blue positions on 
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the physical nodes. We denote them as Blue configurations.  
So far, two Blue nodes may be placed on physical nodes as long as the arc capacity 
constraints are satisfied. But we still need to cross check that the capacity constraints are 
satisfied simultaneously for all Blue nodes. We need to check that all outgoing arcs from 
any given Blue node and all incoming arcs to that same Blue node satisfy the capacity 
constraints simultaneously without over committing available bandwidth. To incorporate 
this, three verifications were carried out on the lists of Blue configurations. 
 
5.1.3 Verification 1 
Verification 1: In this verification we check if all the outgoing arcs from a particular Blue 
node satisfy the capacity constraints at once. This is done by carrying out a row wise 
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The node capacity vectors for this example are represented by:  
 
[ ] [ ]1123511 == BV        ,EV                              (5.3) 
 

































BE     ,EE                               (5.4) 
  
The first Blue node considered is node A. It requires a capacity of 3 to talk to node B 
and a capacity of 1 to talk to node D. When a particular arc satisfies the node and arc 
capacity constraint, the first verification is carried out. A Blue node A can be placed on a 
particular physical node if A can be placed on that physical node for both the arcs A is 
connected to i.e. (A-B) and (A-D). In our case for arcs (A-B) and (A-D), A can be placed 
on physical node 3. But when we do the row-wise check for node D we deduce that for 
arcs (D-A), (D-B) and (D-C) node D can be placed on physical nodes 2 and 3 but not on 
1. The same row-wise check is performed for all the Blue nodes. 
 
5.1.4 Verification 2 
Verification 2: Verification 2 is similar to Verification 1 except that instead of the 
outgoing arcs we check for all the incoming arcs to a particular Blue node. This is done 
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by carrying out a column-wise connectivity check for all the Blue nodes. In (5.4) we now 
look at the columns for all the Blue nodes. For example, Blue node A is connected to B, C 
and D with a capacity requirement of 1 each. Blue node A can be placed on a particular 
physical node if A can be placed on that physical node for all the three arcs (A-B), (A-C) 
and (A-D). A similar check is performed for all the blue nodes.  
 
5.1.5 Verification 3 
Verification 3: This verification checks if placing combinations of blue nodes on the 
physical nodes leads to exhausting the respective arc capacities between the physical 
nodes. We find out if for any blue arc the amount of free capacity on the physical arcs 
becomes negative. For this verification we need to calculate the min-cut for all the Blue 
arcs: the min-cut gives the bottleneck edges that are absolutely necessary for a source to 
communicate to a sink. To do this we perform the following check for all the arcs. Say 
we have a Blue arc (A-B) placed on physical arc (1-2). The available excess capacity e is 
given by: 
  
                                                                          G)(I - (1,2) EE    e ×=                              (5.5) 
where, 
2)-(1 arc from  Maxflow B)(A, BE  I ÷=                          (5.6) 
 
and if ‘e’ is negative we discard the respective arc. EE is the Connectivity matrix of the 
physical graph, BE is the Blue connectivity matrix and G is the min-cut value of arc (1-
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2). One might argue that the last verification does what verification 1 and 2 do separately. 
The reason for this is that there are too many possibilities and it might take forever to 
calculate the Blue node positions as the number of physical nodes could increase to 
thousands of nodes. The calculation time is minimized by removing the arcs that are least 
likely to meet the constraints.     
 
5.1.6 Feasible Blue configurations 
Final Blue configurations: The results obtained from the three verifications are used to 
give the Blue nodes their physical locations. The various combinations of these physical 
nodes are then checked for consistency with the Blue nodes by verifying if they form a 
cycle. After forming the Blue configuration, each Blue configuration is cross checked to 
verify if all the communication capacities available on the physical arcs are sufficient to 
hold all the Blue nodes at once. Let there be ‘n’ such Blue configurations. The set of 
feasible blue configuration mappings is denoted as: 
 
{ }nBC,........,BC,BCBC 21=                                     (5.7) 
 
This process has been implemented using MATLAB. 
  
 5.2 Player 2 - Red 
Player 2: Player 2 is the attacker, denoted by Red. The attacker executes a DDoS attack 
on physical graph E. To disrupt the computer network, it places zombies on E nodes that 
 
 50 
attack nodes or arcs in E to disrupt Blue’s distributed application by preventing Blue 
programs from communicating with each other. The attacker has limited resources, so it 
has to employ the minimum number of zombies and select the minimum number of nodes 
or arcs it has to disable to disrupt Blue connectivity.  
Aim of Player Red:  
1. Disrupt Blue connectivity by disabling maximum number of Blue configurations 
and forcing Blue into a position where it cannot reconfigure itself by entering a 
“loopy” [7] game.  
   
Strategy: Red can disrupt a Blue configuration by placing zombies so as to either: 
1. Attack Node Capacities 
2. Flood Arcs 
 
5.2.1 Attack Node Capacities 
Red can place zombies on the same physical node on which there are one or more 
Blue nodes. No strategies are required for this condition as Red would know how much 
nodal capacity it has to consume in order to disable that Blue node. Hence it is crystal 
clear that Red would win this game if it had enough resources to consume the Blue node 
capacity. If Red cannot place zombies on the same physical node as the Blue then the 
situation becomes more challenging. How would Red know the minimum set of nodes it 
has to disable to disrupt the entire network for all possible blue configurations? This 
section explains how an attacker can determine the set of minimum number of nodes. 
There are ‘n’ Blue configurations out of which one of the Blue configurations is 
considered, say BC1. There are ‘M’ numbers of blue nodes. Each of these blue nodes can 
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be a source and sink. So there will have ‘M’ sources and ‘M’ sinks. For all the possible 
combinations of blue source and sink nodes the min-cut is calculated. This min-cut will 
give a set of the ‘special’ edges removing which the source will be unable to 
communicate to the sink. The attacker will wish to further minimize this set of arcs to 
avoid wasting resources attacking the arcs that do not need to be attacked. This can be 
further explained in detail by an example.   
In Figure 8, Blue needs a flow of 4 from A to B. Red has to disable both arcs with 
capacity 6 and 4 to disable blue connectivity. If the attacker disables arc 6 Blue can still 
send a flow of 4 over the other arc with the capacity 4. So in this case the Red has to 






Figure 8.  Reducing the number of arcs Red has to disable. 
 
Now consider another scenario in which A has to send a flow of 5 to B instead of 4. If 
Red disables the arc with the capacity 4 Blue can stay connected but if Red disables the 
arc with the capacity 6, Blue will not be able to send a flow of 5 over the arc with a 
capacity of 4. So in this case disabling a single arc 6 will suffice. Red does not have to 
unnecessarily waste resources in disabling arc 4. 
4
6
A BFlow = 4
RED ATTACKS 6 AND 4
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To accomplish this we carry out a few steps which will further reduce these arcs.  
1. The set of edges in the min-cut are arranged in the descending order of their 
capacities. 
 
2. Assume C1, C2, C3……Cn are the capacities of these arcs and 
 
 
nC.............CCC ≥≥≥≥ 321                                (5.8) 
 
3. The sum of all the capacities in the min-cut which is denoted by A can be 
represented as: 
 






                                                (5.9)              
 
                                                                  
4. The slack (S) is then calculated by subtracting the Flow from A and is represented 
by: 
 
                              Flow  A  S −=                                             (5.10) 
                         
5. Then a simple flow chart is used to find the set of minimum number of edges we 
need to disable for a particular min-cut. Figure 9 represents the flow chart for 



























Figure 9.  Flow chart for reducing the number of arcs in the min-cut.  
 
To elaborate on this issue we find out the minimum number of arcs the attacker has to 
disable in Figure 8, 
1. Case 1: When the flow is 4, C1 = 6 and C2 = 4. Here, A = 6 + 4 = 10 and the 
Slack(S) = A - Flow = 10 - 4 = 6. Sum = 0 + 6 = 6 and Sum is less than S so ‘i’ is 
incremented to 2. For the next iteration, the Sum becomes 6 + 4 = 10 which is 
greater than S, so we stop. Hence we deduce that we have to disable both arcs 6 
and 4. 
 
2. Case 2: When the flow is 5, C1 = 6 and C2 = 4. Here, A = 6 + 4 = 10 and the 
Slack(S) = A - Flow = 10 - 5 = 5. Also, Sum = 0 + 6 = 6 and Sum is greater than 
S, so we stop and deduce that disabling the arc with the capacity 6 is enough to 
disrupt Blue connectivity. 
 
This gives a reduced set of arcs (R) but we require a set of nodes that we need to 
disable for a Node-attack. To implement this we take this set of arcs and for each arc we 
split the nodes of that arc into two nodes connected by unit capacity. For example 




Sum = Sum +ci
If
Sum > S




This is done for all the arcs in R. The entire graph is then rearranged with these split 
nodes incorporated into it. The split nodes are arranged in such a way that 1 has only 
incoming arcs and 1* has only outgoing arcs (1 and 1* actually mean the same node 1). 
Once this is done the min-cut for this graph is calculated which gives a set of arcs. All the 
split nodes are then merged back to get a min-cut of nodes. In a similar fashion, a set of 
nodes is found for each min-cut of BC1. For the first min-cut of BC1 the set of min-cut of 
nodes is A1, for the second min-cut of BC1 the set of min-cut of nodes is A2 and so on till 
An.     
After this, a set of minimum number of nodes common to all the Blue configurations 
that are absolutely necessary to disable the entire network is selected. For BC1 we will 
have A1, A2, A3, ……, An sets. So for BC1 if either one of the sets i.e. A1 or A2 or A3 or…An is 
disrupted or disabled, Blue will not be able to communicate from a particular source to a 
sink in one of its configuration thus violating the Quality of Service [8], [38] and [53] for 
the respective Blue configuration. 
A similar procedure is followed for BC2, BC3, …, BCn. Consider three Blue 
configurations BC1, BC2 and BC3 with set A1 selected from BC1, A3  from BC2 and A7 from 
BC3. In this case A1 ∩ A3 ∩ A7 are needed to disable Blue. So the last step is to perform an 
AND operation on these sets of nodes corresponding to the Blue configurations. This will 
give us the minimum number of nodes we that we need to disable in order to disrupt Blue 
connectivity for any Blue configuration in BC. This is done by using a search tree with a 
Branch and Bound algorithm. 
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Branch and Bound search tree: A branch and bound algorithm is used to solve problems 
that have a finite but usually very large number of feasible solutions [54] and [55].  
Statement: The problem is to minimize (maximize) a function f(x) of variables (x1, 
x2…..xn) over a region of feasible values. The function f is called an objective function 
and may be of any type [54]. The set of feasible solutions is determined by general 
conditions on the variables. To solve the problem, two components need to be defined. 
The first one is branching by which the feasible region is covered by splitting into several 
smaller sub-regions.  This procedure may be repeated recursively at each of the sub 
regions resulting in a search tree. The second component is bounding which is a fast way 
of finding the upper and lower bounds for the optimal solution. The search terminates 
when there are no unexplored parts. 
An example showing the implementation of Branch and Bound search tree is 
demonstrated below. Consider four Blue configurations: BC1, BC2, BC3 and BC4. A1, A2 
and A3 are sets of nodes that we have to disable. The assumed values of for these sets of 
nodes are shown in Table 5.1. The tree is now built, starting with the minimum number 
of sets of nodes i.e., BC4 as it has only one set of nodes i.e. A1. The tree diagram is shown 
in Figure 10. The root of the tree has only a single node (Minimum number of nodes 
when traversing back the tree, M=1). The next Blue configuration we choose is BC3 as it 
has only two sets: A1 and A2. The tree has two children where the first child has two 
nodes [2, 4] and the second child has a single node [1]. But since 4 is already there in the 
root. So the value of M for child 1 is still 2. The branch and bound search tree chooses the 
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child with minimum number of nodes where the minimum number of nodes is M. Now in 
our case M is equal to 2 for both the options so one of the two children is randomly 
chosen. Suppose A2 is chosen i.e. child 2.  
Table 5.1 Blue configurations and min-cut nodes. 
Set of nodes BC1 BC2 BC3 BC4 
A1 1,2 1 2,4 4 
A2 2 2 1  










Figure 10.  Branch and Bound Search Tree for Node Attack. 
 
Now either BC1 or BC2 is chosen, as both have equal number of ‘A’ sets. In our case, 
BC2 is selected. In BC2 the first child i.e. A1 gives the minimum number of nodes as it 
does not add anything in the list of M. On traversing back it is seen that 1 has already 
been added to the list in level 2. Further considering the last Blue configuration BC1, M 
becomes equal to 3. Now we have to cross check if any other option will give us a lower 
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M. As seen in Figure 10, if A1 is selected instead of A2, M is lower M. So this result is 
discarded and the one with the lower M is chosen. The above Branch and Bound search 
tree has been implemented in C language. On examining the input it is clearly seen that 
disabling set A2 from BC1, set A2 from BC2, set A1 from BC3 and set A1 from BC4 we can 
disable all the above Blue configurations.  
For the node capacity attack it is typically difficult for Red to compromise the servers 
(nodes) used by Blue. When this does occur, Blue can also easily detect Red’s presence 
and disinfect the server. We have discussed the node capacity attacks, their strategies and 
presented the results obtained using the tool in MATLAB but concentrated the focus of 
our analysis and simulations on flooding attacks as they are interesting, very likely to 
occur and difficult to prevent. 
 
5.2.2 Attack Arc Capacities 
In this attack, packets are used to flood links and exhaust arc capacities. The same 
question arises, like in the case of attacking the node capacities - How would the attacker 
know the minimum set of arcs it has to disable to disrupt the entire network for all 
possible Blue configurations? The approach used here is the same as used for attacking 
the nodes except that in this case we don’t have to find arcs from nodes as we already get 
a set of arcs from the min-cut. So we follow the same procedure as used in the discussion 
of attacking node capacities. Table 5.2 shows the Blue configurations and the respective 




Table 5.2 Blue configurations and min-cut nodes. 
Set of nodes BC1 BC2 BC3 BC4 
A1 1-3,2-4 1-3 2-4,1-4 1-4 
A2 2-4 2-4 1-3  










Figure 11.  Branch and Bound Search Tree for Arc Attack. 
 
On examining the input it is clearly seen that disabling set A2 from BC1, set A2 from 
BC2, set A1 from BC3 and set A1 from BC4 can disable all the above Blue configurations. 
The above Branch and Bound search tree has been implemented in C language. 
 
5.2.3 Flooding the Arcs and Zombie Traffic 
At this stage, the arcs that need to be flooded to disable Blue are known. The next 
step is to find out the amount of flow to be directed towards these arcs to disable them. In 
the example explained in Section 5.2.2, arcs (2-4) and (1-4) need to be disabled. Let the 
1-4
1-3
1-3 3-42-4 1-4 4-5
1-3 2-4 2-4 3-4 1-3 2-4 2-4 3-4
Number of arcs: 2 (Minimum)
[2-4, 1-4]




1-3 2-4 1-4 4-53-4
(2)
(3) (2) (4) (2) (3) (4)








minimum flow to be directed towards these arcs to disable them be called as Red traffic 
which is denoted by ‘RT’.  
RT  Red Traffic generated by the zombies 
λ packets  Blue (Legitimate) traffic 
C  Capacity of the physical arc to be attacked 
Total traffic T is given by, 
 
RT    T += λ                                                     (5.11) 
 
Traffic dropped D is given by, 
 
C - )RT  (  D += λ                                                 (5.12) 
 
Percentage of Blue (legitimate) traffic in the total traffic P is given by, 
 
)RT  (    P +÷= λλ                                                (5.13) 
 
Expected rate of Blue (legitimate) traffic loss LTL is given by, 
 
]C - )RT  [( )RT  (    LTL ++÷= λλλ                                 (5.14) 
 
The attacker will win i.e. will be successful in flooding the respective arc if, 
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(BS) Traffic  SlackBlue  LTL ≥                                        (5.15) 
 
where Blue Slack traffic (BS) is given by, 
 
Flow] [Blue -Capacity   BS =                                        (5.16) 
 
If a Blue arc does not have the available capacity to send the required flow it will try 
to send this flow on the other Blue arcs. So we have to check if the other blue nodes have 
a slack that can be used to send this flow. Hence, the Blue flow can be given by,  
 




Nodes] Blue other of  Slack-Capacity  [Blue -Capacity   BS =               (5.18) 
 
Using equation (5.14) and (5.15) we get, 
 
                   ]C - )RT  [( RT)  (    BS ++÷≥ λλλ                                    (5.19) 
 



















                                            (5.20)                                       
 
(5.20) gives us the red traffic an attacker needs to generate in order to disable a Blue 
arc. Also in the above equation, Blue Slack is assumed to be equal to LTL (5.19) which 
need not be true. So ‘traffic’ little more than RT i.e.  (RT + 1) is needed to disable the 
arc. Also in the above case BS is assumed to be less thanλ. If a remainder of zero is 
obtained i.e. when BS = λ, then an infinite amount of flow is needed to disable that arc.    
 
5.2.4 Zombie Placement 
The vulnerable nodes and arcs and the amount of flow to be routed to the arcs are 
now known. The final step is to find the source of Red traffic to be generated i.e. Zombie 
Placement. 
Steps for finding optimal zombie positions, 
1. In every Blue configuration for each physical source and sink we have the max-
flow and the min-cut. Calculate RT for each min-cut using (5.20). The RT is 
calculated for a single arc and not the entire min-cut. It is very easy to convert the 
RT for a single arc to RT for a min-cut. For the capacity C use the sum of the 
physical capacities over all the arcs in the min-cut, λ is Blue traffic over that min-
cut. Blue Slack can be a little difficult to calculate. For simplicity, we will ignore 
Blue interfering with its own traffic. So equation (5.18) becomes, 
 
 
 Capacity] [Blue -Capacity   BS =                              (5.21) 
 
 
where Slack of other blue nodes is assumed to be zero. 
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2. Consider the physical nodes without the Blue nodes as sources (as we do not want 
to place the zombies on the same node as the Blue node). Sinks can be all the 
physical nodes. A good source candidate will be close to the Blue source and a 
good sink candidate will be close to the Blue sink. 
 
3. Check if the max-flow for any of the sources we selected is greater than RT of 
any one min-cut in every Blue configuration. For a Blue configuration if any one 
value of RT < max-flow, select that node. 
 
4. Repeat the above steps for all the Blue configurations. 
 
5.  Pick up a common zombie node in all the Blue configurations. If we do not find a 
single zombie node we have to look for two or maybe more zombie nodes. We 
use the Branch and Bound search tree [54], [55] to calculate the minimum number 
of zombie nodes common to all the Blue configurations. The above Branch and 
Bound search tree has been implemented in C language. 
 











We now know the number of zombies required to disrupt all the Blue configurations 
in BC but what if the attacker does not have enough zombies to disable all the Blue 
configurations but lesser number of zombies that will only disable some of the Blue 
configurations in BC? This gives Blue a chance to reconfigure from the DDoS attack 
from a particular Blue configuration that is attacked to another Blue configuration that 
Red cannot attack. This way we can have a board game set up. We know explain a few 
terms like the surreal numbers and Combinatorial Game Theory that are required for 
further understanding of the material discussed in this section.  
 
6.1.1 Surreal Numbers and Combinatorial Game Theory 
Surreal Numbers: A surreal number [6], [56], [57], [58] is a pair of sets (Left set and 
Right set) of previously created surreal numbers. No member of the Right set may be less 
than or equal to any member of the Left set. Also a surreal number x is less than or equal 
to a surreal number y if and only if y is less than or equal to no member of x’s left set, 
and no member of y’s right set is less than or equal to x. 
 Please refer to [57], [58] and [59] for further information on surreal numbers.  
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To understand surreal numbers in detail some examples of how real numbers can be 
represented as surreal numbers are given below. 
{ } |   0 ≡     ‘≡’ is to represent equality in surreal numbers 
{ } | 0   1 ≡   as 1 is greater than 0 
{ } 0 |   1- ≡   as -1 is less than 0 
Similarly we can represent 2 and -1 with the above equations, 
{ } | 1   2 ≡  and { } 1- |   2- ≡  
Also we can define numbers like ½ and -½ in the form of surreal numbers, 
{ } 1 | 0    
2
1 ≡  and { } 0 | 1    
2
1 - ≡  
Also a real number does not necessarily be represented in surreal numbers in a 
particular way; there are multiple representation ways in surreal numbers for real 
numbers. For example, 
{ } |1 0,  ,1-   2 ≡  
{ } |1 ,0   2 ≡  
{ } |1 0,  ,1-   2 ≡  
and { } | 1   2 ≡  
We now know these surreal numbers: −2, −1, −½, 0, ½, 1, and 2. Again, we can 
create new surreal numbers based on these. 
Combinatorial Game Theory: The definition of surreal numbers contains one restriction 
that each element of the Left set must be strictly less than each element of the Right set. 
If this restriction is dropped we can generate a more general class known as games. A 
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combinatorial game [60] typically involves two players, called Left and Right and the 
corresponding pair of sets – Left set and Right set. Addition, negation, multiplication, and 
comparison are all defined the same way for both surreal numbers and games. Every 
surreal number is a game, but not all games are surreal numbers. There are several types 
of these two-player perfect information games. A particular one that is of interest with 
respect to this thesis is the one that does not result in any ties and has one of the four 
outcomes, player Left wins, player Right wins, the first player to move wins or the 
second player to move wins [60]. A mathematical theory has been developed for 
analyzing the strategies a player will use in order to win the game using game trees. A 
game tree has a root node that is the starting point of the game. The root node has zero or 
left branches (options) for the Left player and zero or right branches for the Right player 
i.e. moves for Right player are represented by edges that go down and right and moves 
for Left player are represented by edges that go down and left. Each player sees the 
options it has and makes the move that maximizes his gain. Game trees can be 
represented systematically as a generalization of surreal numbers in the form: 
 
                                    1 1{ ... | ... }n mL L R R                                                   (6.1)  
 
where Left can choose any move from L1 to Ln and Right can choose any move from R1 
to Rm. Every element Li and Ri of Equation (6.1) is either a numeric value or a recursive 




:i j i jL R L R∀ ∀ <                                                   (6.2) 
 
then Equation (6.1) has a unique numeric value. The value of a surreal number where 
Condition (6.2) holds is the “simplest” number between the greatest L value (Lmax) and 
smallest R value (Rmin) [59]. Typically, the simplest number has the value 
2k
j
i + in range 
(Lmax…Rmin) where i, j, and k are integers and k is a minimum. If Condition (6.2) is not the 
case, i.e.: 
 
:i j i jL R L R∃ ∃ ≥                                                    (6.3) 
 
Then the number is ill formed. It represents a game and the value of the game 
depends on the sequence of moves taken.  Consider a simple example of a game tree 
shown in Figure 12. This game tree can be represented in surreal numbers as; 
 
} 8- || } 5 | 10 {  ,{  G 15=  
 
If Right plays first then he has only one option, so he gains 8 points from the Left 
player. If Left plays first, he has two options, either to collect 15 points from Right or 
move to the game {10 | 5}. If he moves to the game {10 | 5}, Right plays next and gives 
player Left 5 points. Player Left would prefer to gain 15 points rather than 5, so if Left 









Figure 12.  Game tree representation for G. 
 
These games have the following rules [6]: 
1. There are just two players, called Left and Right 
2. There are several positions and a starting point. 
3. There are clearly defined rules that specify the moves that either player can make 
from a given position to its options. 
4. Left and Right move alternately, in the game as a whole. 
5. The player unable to move looses. 
6. Both players know what is going on, i.e. complete information 
7. The rules are such that the play will always come to an end, as some player will 
be unable to move. 
For this thesis we have modified the rules of the game to best suit the options 
available and they are given in Section 6.1.2. Before we jump to the rules of the game 






Loopy Games: Combinatorial game theory usually assumes no position may be repeated. 
The games we discuss may involve repetition. A loopy game [7], [61] and [62] is one that 
allows repeated positions. Every game that permits repetition faces the possibility of non-
terminating play i.e. cycles in the graph. For these games the stopping conditions are 
required and need to be pre-defined for the game in question.  This is typically resolved 
by declaring infinite plays as a “draw game” as in Chess. But there can be other stopping 
conditions, like Hare and Hounds where for infinite plays Hare is the winner [6], [61]. 
For the DDoS games, we allow repetition (loopy games). The rules for the game and the 
pre-defined stopping conditions are discussed in the next sub-section. For more 
information on loopy games refer to [61] and [62]. 
 
6.1.2 Example Game 
Rules of the Game: Based on the Combinatorial Game Theory we now define the rules 
for the two players of the DDoS game – Red i.e. Right Player and Blue i.e. Left Player 
before they actually begin to play the game.  
Rules for Blue: 
1. Blue always starts the game. 
2. Blue is allowed only one move at a time. 
3. Blue can select one possible configuration out of the available Blue 
configurations. Blue chooses a configuration that is not currently disabled by Red. 
 
4. Blue cannot have redundancy i.e. multiple Blue copies. 
5. Blue reconfigures by moving a single process from a physical node to another i.e. 




6. Blue cannot move to a configuration that Red can attack using the present set of 
zombies. 
 
7. Blue will try to find a loopy game [7], [61] and force Red into it where it can 
always move to the previous configuration. If Blue succeeds in creating a “loopy” 
game where Red cannot escape from the loop, it wins since it can recover from 
any attack. 
 
8. Blue has perfect knowledge of Red’s zombie positions. 
9. Stopping Condition: If Blue cannot make a move to any one of its options that is 
not under attack by Red, Blue loses. 
Rules for Red: 
1. Red is also allowed one move at a time. 
2. Once Red places a zombie on a particular node it cannot move that zombie until 
its next turn. 
 
3. Red tries to force Blue into a position where it cannot reconfigure itself. 
4. Red tries to choose a zombie or a set of zombies that can affect maximum 
elements of BC (as he does not have enough zombies to affect all the elements of 
BC).  
 
5. Red has perfect knowledge of the Blue configurations and what configuration 
Blue has chosen for the current move. 
 
6. Stopping Condition: If Red is unable to find a zombie to attack the current 
configuration that Blue is in or if Blue forces Red into a loopy game Red looses. 
 
Let’s consider an example. The moves of the Blue player are the configurations it can 
reach from the current configuration. Our example has 3 Blue nodes and 6 physical 
nodes. The MATLAB tool has given us 10 Blue configurations say [1, 2, 3………10] 
that satisfy all the constraints and we require 5 zombies to disable all ten Blue 
configurations. But due to limited resources Red can only use 2 zombies at a time. Each 
combination of 2 zombies is a Red move denoted by A, B, C, …., and so on. Table 6.1 
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shows the details of the game. We assume that Blue starts the game with Blue 
configuration 2 and in response to that move Red can either choose A or C (as both the 
zombie moves – A and C can disable Blue configuration 2). 
 
Table 6.1 Details of an example Game 
Blue configuration Reconfigure Zombie Move Zombies Disrupt Blue configurations  
1 2, 3, 4 A 3, 5 1, 2, 7 
2 1, 5, 6 B 1, 6 3, 4, 5 
3 1, 7 C 3, 4 2, 6, 9 
4 1,10 D 1,5 8, 9, 10 
5 2, 8, 9    
6 2, 9    
7 3, 10    
8 5    
9 5, 6    
10 4, 7    
 
Let’s assume that Red chooses A. The game tree for the above example would look 
like Figure 13. If we have to denote these game trees in the form of surreal numbers, the 
first level would look like {1, 5, 6 | A, B, C, D} where 1, 5, 6 are moves Blue can make 
(from Blue configuration 2) and A, B, C, D are moves Red can make. As we can see in 
Figure 13.a at level 2 if Blue chooses configuration 6 it will loose but if it chooses 
configuration 5 it has a stronger chance of winning. If Blue can form a loop as shown in 
Figure 13.b [2-5-2] and [5-8-5] Blue will never loose as it can keep looping between 
these two nodes and Red will never be able to disrupt it as it will keep reconfiguring 
itself. In 1a we can see that Red has led Blue into a position where Blue is unable to 










                       (a)                                                                        (b) 
Figure 13. Game trees (a) Red Wins (b) Loopy Game – Blue Wins                                                              




6.2 Sum of Games and Thermographs 
In practice, any given enterprise relies on multiple distributed processes. So, rather 
than Blue having one distributed application, it can have multiple distributed 
applications. Similarly, an attacker can not expect to destroy all of the processes used by 
the enterprise at any point in time. The attacker will try to maximize the number of 
processes it can disable at any point in time. This situation describes a “sum of games” 
problem [6], where Blue and Red alternate moves. We have modified the rules for the 
“sum of games” problem to best suit the options available and they are given in Section 
6.2.1. The payoff’s for the end nodes in the Blue configurations is the smallest slack 
bandwidth on a min-cut of the configuration i.e. the remaining slack on the physical arc 
after Red has attacked.  
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BLUE WINS THE GAME
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the player chooses a game i.e. a distributed process out of the multiple distributed 
processes and a move to make in that game in order to maximize the value of the game.  









=∑                                                      (6.4) 
 
We consider the value of the sum of games to determine the best move for the player 
according to his needs. Of particular importance are the following results (proofs in [56]): 
Theorem 1: Calculating the value of a sum of games is NP-hard. 
Theorem 2: Finding the optimal sequence of moves for a sum of games is PSPACE-
complete. 
Convincing example game trees for these assertions are in [56]. These theorems state 
that a truly optimal strategy for a sum of games is only found by an exhaustive search of 
the alternatives. This requires exponential time and is unsuited for non-trivial problems. 
Instead of finding the best possible solution it is possible to find approximate solutions 
within a constant offset of optimal [56]. Though this problem has been shown to be P-
Space complete [56] Berlekamp has used thermographs, to tractably find near optimal 
solutions.  
In this section we introduce a concept called thermographs that show how chilling the 
surreal number game representation in the form of Equation (6.1) can find approximately 
optimal strategies for sums of games. In a really complicated battle or a hot game [6], a 
 
 73 
player will have a difficult time in deciding what move to make so he has to use some 
sort of strategy to cool the game where he can easily make a decision. 
Thermographs: Thermographs are use to calculate the value of a game. The variability of 
a game is its temperature. When all L and R values in Equation (6.1) are atomic and 
Condition (6.3) is true, the temperature can be computed by averaging the negative of the 
smallest R value with the largest L value. This is the amount that stands to be gained by 
either player initiating a move. A game where much (little) stands to be gained or lost is 
hot (cold) [6]. We use the relative temperatures of the component games Gi,j to decide 
which game in Equation (6.4) to play in at any point in time. 
The game temperature comes from the insight that the mean value of a game may be 
kept constant, but the variability reduced if a tax t were imposed for making a move. This 
process (cooling) is done by modifying the game Gt : 
 
{ | }L R
t t t
G G t G t= − +                                             (6.5) 
 
The coordinate system used in drawing thermographs has the tax on the y-axis and game 
value on the x-axis [63]. The values on the x-axis are in descending order to keep Left’s 
moves to the left and Right’s move to the right.  
As tax t increases, both sides reach a common value that is the game’s mean value 
[56]. The smallest tax needed to reach the game’s mean value is its temperature or 
freezing point. For each game that does not contain a possible loop, its thermograph ends 
in an infinite vertical mast. Generalized thermographs for games that contain loops are 
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described in [7]. 
Figure 14 is a thermograph for game {2 | -1}. This game reduces to a mean value of ½ 
when it is taxed (cooled) by any value over 1½. The temperature t=1½ is the freezing 
point of this game.  
 
 
Figure 14. Thermograph of the game {2 | -1}. 
 
To plot a thermograph, start with the atomic games where Left and Right’s choices are 
numbers and recurse upwards. For example, Figure 15 shows the thermograph of {{5 | -
5} | -20}. First plot the thermograph of {5 | -5} by marking the Left and Right choices for 
t=0 on the horizontal axis then plotting the game values as t increases until the Left and 
Right values converge [64]. Since the value on the right is already a number (-20), its 
thermograph is just a vertical mast.  
The next step is to plot the thermograph of {{5 | -5} | -20} using the thermograph of {5 
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| -5}. After Left has moved to {5 | -5} it will be Right’s turn so -5 is the starting point on 
the left. The temperature of the freezing point of {5|-5} is 5. So the left edge of the 
thermograph starts at point (-5, 5). 
The game -20 has value -20 and freezing point t=0. So the right edge of the 
thermograph starts at point (-20, 0). We follow Equation (6.5) by subtracting a tax t from 
the left and adding it to the right, until the two values converge. As shown in Figure 15, 
this gives us the freezing point (temperature) of 10 and a mean value of -10. More 
examples can be found in [6]. 
 
 
Figure 15. Thermograph for {{5 | -5} || -20}. 
 
The thermograph allows us to simplify the game by summarizing a complex game tree 
into two aspects: (i) the temperature summarizes the importance of a game by stating the 
amount of variability, and (ii) the range of values at a temperature state (distance from the 
Left to the Right mast of the thermograph) shows how much stands to be gained at that 
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temperature. Note that where a mast exists, no side stands to gain anything by playing 
that game. 
Thermograph based strategies: The use of thermographs for determining game strategies 
is described in detail in [7] and [6]. The main concept of this approach is “chilling” or 
reducing the temperature of the game represented in the thermograph [65].  
By starting with a high temperature (tax) and considering only games where something 
stands to be gained at that temperature, it is possible to dramatically reduce the search 
space of the problem. Of particular interest is this result [56]. 
To find the sum of games and make an optimal move in that game we need to add 
thermographs, but we cannot just add thermographs [6], [64], [62]. When there are too 
many components, the optimal strategy can be very complex and time and computing 
resources required determining the best move would be substantially magnanimous. 
Theorem 3: For any sum of games, it is possible to find a strategy that attains the optimal 
value of the sum to within the value of the second most valuable game. 
In [64], three strategies are proposed that use temperature t to find near optimal 
strategies within the bounds of theorem three. Assuming that the game has a current tax 
rate t active, choose from among the active games the one that: 
• Hotstrat – has the maximum temperature, 
• Thermostrat – has the largest difference in value between the left and right 
bound at tax t. 
• Sentestrat – is the region where your opponent just moved. 
In the majority of cases, these three strategies are equivalent. But there are cases where 
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hotstrat behaves poorly.  
To determine the optimal move for the DDoS games we plan to use the thermostrat 
strategy as thermostrat makes a million optimal moves and a few sub-optimal moves [6]. 
The same thing cannot be stated about the other two strategies.    
 Thermostrat: To understand thermostrat, we will make the reader go through an 
example. Consider a game C that is made up of A+B. There can be many such games but 
we illustrate two games for simplicity. We need to find an optimal move for player Left 
(Blue), in the games A and B. First we draw the individual thermographs for A and B. 
Figure 16 shows the individual thermographs for game B and game A where B = {12|6} 











Figure 16. Thermographs for B and A. 
 
B = {12|6} A = {{8|4}|{-4|-8}}
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The next step for the Left (Right) player is to add the Right (Left) boundaries of the 
individual thermograph at each tax level to get the compound thermograph. So the right 
boundary of the compound thermograph is given by; 
 
)B(R)A(R)C(R ttt +=                                         (6.6) 
 
 This behavior is demonstrated in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Right boundaries for compound thermograph at each tax interval for Left 
(Blue) 
 
Tax Level (t) Rt(A) + Rt(B) Rt(C) 
0 6 + (-4) 2 
1 7 + (-4) 3 
2 8 + (-4) 4 
3 9 + (-3) 6 
4 9 + (-2) 7 
5 9 + (-1) 8 
6 9 + (-0) 9 
7 9 + (-0) 9 
 
We then calculate the width of the compound Thermograph, by taking the maximum 
width of A and B at each tax level. So the maximum width (Wt) at each tax level is given 
by; 
 
    )}B(W ),A(Wmax{W ttt =                                       (6.7) 
 
This behavior is demonstrated in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 Maximum Width at each tax interval 
Tax Level (t) Width of A Width of B Maximum Width 
0 8 6 8 
1 8 4 8 
2 8 2 8 
3 6 0 6 
4 4 0 4 
5 2 0 2 
6 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
 
 
The next step is to add the Maximum Width and the Right boundaries at each 
interval. 
Table 6.4 Adding Maximum Width and the Right Boundary of each game 
 
Tax Level  (t) Max Width + Rt(C) 
0 8 + 2 = 10 
1 8 + 3 = 11  
2 8 + 4 = 12 
3 6 + 6 = 12 
4 4 + 7 = 11 
5 2 + 8 = 10 
6 0 + 9 = 9 
7 0 + 9 = 9 
 
The maximum value of Game C is 12 and it is 12 at tax level 2 and 3. So the 
temperatures at which Left feels most comfortable are T = 2 and T = 3. Since Left would 
try to be safe and prefer only as much as heat as is absolutely necessary, he chooses the 




The ambient temperature is the least T for which RT(A) + RT(B) + WT is maximal. 




We now present a working example consisting of 3 distributed Blue applications. For 
determining the process in which the move has to be made, we make use of Thermostrat 
strategy. 
Rules of the Game (in addition to the previous rules):   
1. The payoff’s for the end nodes in the Blue configurations is the remaining slack 
on the physical arc after Red has attacked. This can be given as; 
 
BS)  (RT - Arc Physical ofCapacity    SlackRemaining +=          (6.8) 
2. If Red is successful in placing a zombie(s) for a particular configuration, then this 
left-over slack will most definitely be a negative value. Blue will try to maximize 
this Left over slack and have the best performance for users and Red will try to 
minimize it and cause the users to suffer the most. For the game, we would like to 
determine not only who would win or loose but who would win or loose and by 
how much.  
 
3. So if the two players have two options of -1 and -4. Red will choose -4 and Blue 
will choose -1.  
 
4. Blue reconfigures by moving a single process from a physical node to another 
also since we have a directed graph to move a process from one node to another, 
there should be a direct link connecting the nodes. So there might be nodes a 
player can move a process to, but may not be able to move the process back to the 
node. This gives the problem a very practical approach as Blue will not always 
have loopy games at every position. 
 
5. Loopy Games [61], [64] are incorporated in the game and one can specify which 
player (Left or Right) will win the game if the game is loopy. In our case if Blue 




6. The Combinatorial Game Suite (CGSuite) [61] is an open source program built to 
aid research in combinatorial game theory. Given the values, it can be used to plot 
thermographs. It also has added functionality and full support for loopy games. 
Also in CGSuite one can specify which player wins the game if the game is loopy. 
Entering a game in CGSuite is very simple, its just entering it in the surreal 
number form like G = {2|-4}. To plot the thermograph of G, one just has to type 
Plot(Thermograph(G)). Entering loopy games is a little difficult. If we have A = 
{B|C} and B = {A|D}. Now if we have to enter the game A, one has to put in, 
P:=A:{B:{|A||D}|C}. Loopy games will not be simplified automatically unless 
they are stoppers. To simplify loopy games, we have to input Sidle(P). Also if we 
want the Left (Right) player to win when the game is loopy, we will type 
Onside(P) (Offside(P)). We can plot both the thermographs on one plot using 
KoPlot(P). 
 
   
Now we present the assumed values for the 3 Blue distributed application: 
1. 1st Distributed Application: The first distributed application has 6 Blue 










































2. 2nd Distributed Application: The first distributed application has 10 Blue 



















Figure 18. Game Tree for distributed application 2 – Game 2. 
 
3. 3rd Distributed Application: The second distributed application has 12 Blue 





















































Figure 19. Game Tree for distributed application 3 – Game 3. 
 
The next step is to use the Thermostrat strategy to decide which game Blue chooses 
and makes a move in it in order to cause least difficulty to the users. Like the example 
used to explain the thermostrat strategy, we will solve this example in a similar fashion. 
Figure 20 represents the thermographs of each of these games. Tables 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 
represent the calculation done on these thermographs to find the compound thermograph. 
Since Blue is the Left player we first have to find the sum of all the Right boundaries at 
respective tax levels (Table 6.5). Table 6.6 shows the maximum width (Wt) at each tax 
level and the finally in Table 6.7 we add the Maximum Width and the Right boundaries 



































                
 




























































Table 6.5 Right boundaries for compound thermograph at each tax interval for Left 
(Blue) 
 
Tax Level (t) Rt(K) + Rt(L) + Rt(R) Rt(G) 
0 (-5) + (-3) + (-3) -11 
0.5 (-5) + (-2.75) + (-3) -10.75 
1 (-5) + (-2.25) + (-2.5) -9.75 
1.5 (-5) + (-2.25) + (-2.25) -9.50 
2 (-5) + (-2.25) +(-2.25) -9.50 
2.5 (-5) + (-2.25) +(-2.25) -9.50 
3 (-4.75) + (-2.25) +(-2.25) -9.25 
 
Table 6.6 Maximum Width at each tax interval 
 
Tax Level (t) Width of K Width of L Width of R Maximum Width 
0 1 1 2 2 
0.5 1 0 1.5 1.5 
1 1 0 1 1 
1.5 1 0 0 1 
2.0 1 0 0 1 
2.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 
3.0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 6.7 Adding Maximum Width and the Right Boundary of each game 
Tax Level  (t) Max Width + Rt(G) 
0 -11 + 2 = -9 
0.5 -10.75 + 1.5 = -9.25 
1 -9.75 + 1 = -8.75 
1.5 -9.5 + 1 = -8.5 
2 -9.5 + 1 = -8.5 
2.5 -9.5 + 0.5 = -9 
3 -9.25 + 0 = -9.25 
 
The maximum value of Game G is -8.5 and it is -8.5 at tax level 1.5 and 2. So the 
temperatures at which Left feels most comfortable are T = 1.5 and T = 2. Since Left 
would try to be safe and prefer only as much as heat as is absolutely necessary, he 
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chooses the minimum ambient temperature which is T = 1.5. In [6] this concept is very 
nicely summarized as; 
The component that is widest at T = 1.5 is A so player Left should make a move in 
component K. Also notice that K has a loopy game and Blue would definitely benefit by 





















SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter includes results from the MATLAB tool and the simulations done on 
a network using SSFNet simulator [66]. The MATLAB tool is used to find the possible 
Blue configurations for Blue and the zombie places for Red, for a given network and a 
distributed application. In order to verify if the tool correctly calculates the Blue 
configurations, the zombie places and if the calculated zombie places are minimum in 
number we perform a few simulations using SSFNet.  
 
7.1 Results from MATLAB Tool 
Figure 21 represents a physical network of 10 physical nodes and 30 arcs. The distributed 
application comprises of 3 Blue nodes. Figure 21.a is the physical network and Figure 







                                       (a)                                                              (b) 














 The connectivity matrices EE and BE, where the capacities are in units of Mbps, are 
given by; 


































 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
















BE                                (7.1) 
 
The exact input and the output of the MATLAB tool are in appendix A for further 
reference. The results give 70 possible Blue configurations for the network shown in 
Figure 21.   
For a DDoS attack an attacker can deploy thousands of zombies so we had to 
consider a very large network to give the attack a more realistic approach. So the number 
of physical nodes was increased to 500 and about 1500 arcs connected these nodes. The 
number of Blue nodes was increased to 5. These results are not attached to prevent 
repetition.  
  
7.2 SSFNet Simulations 
To verify that if the Blue configurations are generated correctly and the number of 
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zombies and generated traffic RT are both minimum few verifications are performed on 
the generated results. 
Verification 1: Blue nodes are randomly placed on physical nodes (other than current 
Blue hosts) with large capacities. This is to verify if the physical nodes that are discarded 
are short of bandwidth and possibly cannot host the Blue nodes. When SSFNet 
simulations were performed for these, some Blue (TCP) connections did not show any 
packet drops. But for every simulation at least one or more TCP connection exhibited 
packet drops. This would be unacceptable as this would violate the Quality of Service 
requirements for that Blue configuration. 
Verification 2: Next we verify if the number of zombies obtained through the MATLAB 
tool is minimal. For this a random number of zombies and random places were chosen. 
Also zombie places close to the Blue sources were checked as places that would be good 
candidates for Red zombies. Randomly placed zombies did cause a DDoS attack, but the 
number of zombies required to do the attack were greater than or equal to the number of 
zombies generated by the MATLAB tool.  The example we discuss in the next section 
does not have zombies close to the Blue sources but still manages to cause a successful 
DDoS attack. 
  For analysis, we assigned different colors to the hosts in SSFNet. The normal clients are 
blue and the servers are red. Both the client and server are denoted by square shapes. The 
router has a diamond shape and has been assigned yellow color. When there are packet 
drops these router turn into a dark pink color. The DDoS router and the client are 















Figure 22. SSFNet animation snapshot showing the colors assigned to different hosts. 
 
7.3 Example and Discussion 
Now we perform SSFNet simulations for the example in section 7.1. The simulation 
time was set to 1000 seconds. The Blue configuration that was chosen randomly for the 
simulation was [2, 3, 8]. The minimum number of zombies needed to attack this Blue 
configuration was placed on physical nodes [1, 9]. The normal traffic starts at 200 
seconds. The attack command is given at 250 seconds and the attack traffic starts at 270 
seconds and ends at 390 seconds.  Both the queue monitor and IP flow monitor were used 
to collect data statistics. Since we have not incorporated the use of queues for our 









the animation snapshot of the example and the corresponding graphs of statistics 
collected using the queue monitor. The graphs statistics show the packets sent and the 
queue length at the attacked router. The requests (attack packets) are sent to the server 
connected to the router. But the filtering and the attack are evident at the router to which 
the server is attached. Figure 23.a represents the snapshot when the attack has just started 
on node 2. One can clearly see that three nodes  2, 3 and 10 are pink in color i.e. there 
is continuous packet drop on these three nodes. On examining the min-cut sets of arcs, 
node 3 to node 2 have four arcs in the min-cut set – [3-1], [10-3], [9-4] and [10-4] and 
then if we look at the packet drops, router 3 and router 10 have packet drops along with 
router 2 clearly indicating the bottleneck at the arcs connecting these nodes has been 
exhausted. Figure 23.b shows the exceeded queue length of router 2. Similar kind of 
behavior is seen at router 10 and router 3, though the packet drops at router 3 are much 
higher. Node 8 to node 2 has one arc in the min-cut set  [3-1] signifying that packet 
drops should occur at node 3 as node 3-1 will be the bottleneck link. Note that this 
snapshot is taken at the time where only Node 2 is attacked. So the packet drop on node 3 
at this time of the simulation has occurred due to it being on the min-cut arc connecting 
node 8 to node 2 and not due it being a Blue host.  
For verification purposes zombie nodes placed were placed on physical nodes – 5, 6 
and 7 that were strongly connected to the Blue sources. These nodes being very close to 
source do cause flooding and packet drops at the Blue sources they are close to. For 
example a zombie placed at node 6 causes packet drops at node 8 but fails to affect node 
2 and 3. The same scenario is seen when we place a zombie on 7, it only affects node 8. 
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One of the reasons why 1 and 9 are good zombie places is that they are strongly 
connected to the nodes belonging to the min-cut and the Blue sources. Also they have 
much larger capacities than node 5,6 and 7 thereby causing more DDoS flow to be 











































Figure 23. SSFNet simulation for Example 1 (a) Animation (b) Graphical statistics 
Attacked Router 2 – Packet drop 
Router 3 – Node on mincut Arc of 3-2 and 8-2 
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In SSFNet nodes are represented starting with 0, so the 10 nodes are represented from 
0-9 and the node so in the graphs the attacked router 2 is represented by 1.  
Next we simulated the example of a large network that has 500 nodes and about 1500 
arcs. In this example we required 5 zombies to disrupt Blue. SSFNet simulator is scalable 
and easy to use even for large networks. To prevent repetition we have just included the 
graphs (Figure 24) that are obtained at the attacked nodes. This is a live plot of the 












































One more observation during simulations was that the queue length had to be 
adjusted to get accurate results. This value varied according to the number of nodes and 
the arc capacities. Several rounds of simulations had to be performed to zero down on an 









CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
A generic framework for modeling network attacks is presented. With sufficient 
resources, it is shown that an intelligent attacker can successfully and permanently 
disable a network. A detailed methodology is presented where attackers with perfect 
knowledge of the networks they are attacking can use a modification of the well known 
max-flow min-cut algorithms to disable networks through packet flooding. The results 
show that we have been successful in quantifying the resources an attacker needs to 
disable a distributed application. This information can be used to build robust DDoS 
resistant networks.   
We also set up a game between the attacker and multiple distributed applications of 
any enterprise. In practice, the attacker might not have sufficient resources to disrupt all 
the processes of an enterprise so he will try to maximize the number of processes it can 
disable. In reaction to this an enterprise can shift to another configuration that has not 
been attacked. Both the players have to determine the best process to make a move in. 
This problem is P-Space complete, so we have tried to solve problem using concepts of 
Combinatorial Game Theory and Thermographs. We have been able to provide 
reconfiguration strategies for the distributed application using thermostrat.  
 In this research it was assumed that both players have a perfect knowledge of the 
network. Games can be devised and studied in which knowledge of the graph is obtained 
over the course of time. Also we have assumed that the blue program does not have any 
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redundancy i.e. multiple copies. Adding redundancy to the blue program will have 
advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantage obviously being that it will improve 
blue connectivity. The disadvantage being that we will require additional resources.  
Further research will be focused on: 
1. Introducing background traffic (with Pareto distribution) which is neither attack 
traffic nor Blue traffic.  
2. Players not having perfect knowledge  
3. Introducing redundancy to Blue 
4. Cross-checking the reconfiguration strategy results obtained from the 
thermographs using simulations 
5. Comparing the three strategies, thermostrat, hotstrat and Sentestrat 
6. Calculation of approximate queue length.       
The following application domains could benefit from this approach: 
1. Local Area Networks (LANs): We assume there are no zombies on local 
machines, but zombies exist in the larger Internet that may target processes on the 
LAN. This approach identifies system bottlenecks and tells the administrator if 
the volume of the external traffic is enough to compromise distributed processes 
on the LAN. 
2. Corporate Networks: When geographically separate offices (remote locations) are 
connected over the Internet using a Virtual Private Network (VPN), zombies can 
attack the VPN traffic that travels through the global Internet. By considering the 
graph structure of the VPN connections between corporate controlled autonomous 
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systems, it is possible to create an adaptive VPN infrastructure that can tolerate 
DDoS attacks. 
3. Global routing problems: Routing between autonomous systems (AS’s) uses the 
Border Gateway Protocol, which is subject to instability in the presence of 
flooding DDoS attacks. Since some domains (*.edu, *.net, *.ru, …) are more 
likely to host zombies than others (*.mil, *.gov, …), we can analyze the AS graph 
structure to determine if the volume of traffic reaching sensitive BGP nodes is 

























































MATLAB Tool Results 
  
The results obtained on 10 physical nodes (30 arcs) and 3 Blue nodes are given 
below. These results include the possible Blue configurations (Blue_Placement), the 
number of zombies and the corresponding zombie places (Final_Zombie_List) for the 
following number of physical nodes (N), EE (Red_Con_Mat), EV (Red_CPU_load), 
number of blue nodes (Z), (BE) Blue_Con_Mat  and (BV) Blue_CPU_load. 
 
Results –Example 1: 
N = 
 





   (3,1)        1000000 
   (5,1)        1000000 
   (4,2)        1000000 
   (6,2)        1000000 
   (8,2)        1000000 
   (9,2)        2000000 
   (1,3)        3000000 
   (9,3)        2000000 
  (10,3)        2000000 
   (9,4)        1000000 
  (10,4)        1000000 
   (1,5)        1000000 
   (7,5)        1000000 
   (2,6)        1000000 
   (7,6)        1000000 
   (8,6)        1000000 
   (5,7)        2000000 
   (6,7)        2000000 
   (8,7)        1000000 
   (1,8)        5000000 
   (2,8)        1000000 
   (5,8)        1000000 
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   (1,9)        1000000 
   (2,9)        1000000 
   (3,9)        1000000 
   (4,9)        1000000 
   (8,9)        1000000 
  (10,9)        1000000 
   (3,10)       2000000 
   (4,10)       2000000 















   (2,1)        2000000 
   (3,1)        2000000 
   (1,2)        1000000 
   (3,2)        1000000 
   (1,3)        2000000 
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     2     4     3 
     2     4     8 
     2     4     9 
     2     4    10 
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     2     5     9 
     2     5    10 
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     2     8     9 
     2     8    10 
     2     9     3 
     2     9     8 
     2     9    10 
     2    10     3 
     2    10     8 
     2    10     9 
     3     1     2 
     3     1     9 
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     3     2     9 
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     3     4     2 
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     3     8     9 
     3     8    10 
     3     9     2 
     3     9    10 
     3    10     2 
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     9     1     2 
     9     1     3 
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     9     2    10 
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    10     8     9 
    10     9     2 
    10     9     3 
 
Final_Zombie_List =  
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    [] 
    [         1] 
    [         1] 
    [         1] 
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    [         1] 
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    [         9] 
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    [] 
    [1   9] 
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SSFNet [66] is a network simulator developed by the SSFNet project. The simulator 
consists of three major parts, SSF, DML, and SSFNet. It is a collection of Java SSF-
based components for modeling and simulation of Internet protocols and networks at and 
above the IP packet level of detail. Domain Modeling Language (DML) is a public-
domain standard for attribute databases for model configuration and verification. It 
supports extensibility, inheritance and substitution of attributes. One of the main reasons 
for using SSFNet in our simulations is that it is scalable. Due to this one can simulate 
large scale networks with ease. The approach had to be tested on a large scale network as 
an attacker can easily deploy thousands or millions of zombies. 
 
B.1 Using SSFNet 
In order to use SSFNet (latest version 2.0) one needs to get install SSFNet and 
JDK1.3. To run SSFNet, we first need to set the classpaths to the jar files in the directory 
ssfnet/lib and the parent directory of any of the classpaths required. To configure a 
network one needs to write a DML file. It has a very simple syntax. Informally speaking, 
it's a list of attributes. Each attribute is a key-value pair. The attribute key is basically an 
identifier. The attribute value can be a number or a string. To learn DML for SSFNet, the 
best way would be to see the examples in the ssfnet directory or in [66]. Specially [66] 
goes through the meaning of each line in the DML file. This includes configuring a Net, a 
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Host or a Router, the links connecting the hosts and NIC’s. The host can be either a 
server or a client. In our directed graph, each node should have the capability to both send 
and receive. So to incorporate this in SSFNet we have made each node to have three 
nodes in it i.e. a server host, a client host and a router. The server and the client are 
connected to the router with bandwidth that is 100 times or much more than the 
bandwidth connecting the two routers.  For e.g. if we have two physical nodes 1 and 2 











  EE  
 
Then in SSFNet we will configure it as shown in Figure 25. Note that the 
bidirectional link between the router and the each of the host has much more capacity 
than it requires. This is done in order to simulate a single node that can act both as a 

















Figure 25. SSFNet representation of two Nodes A and B. 
 
To simulate the distributed application Blue, TCP connections were set up between 
the physical nodes of Blue configuration (Blue_Placement). Any one Blue configuration 
was picked up at random. Zombies were placed on the physical nodes in the SSFNet 
network simulator according to the Zombie Placement (Final_Zombie_List) and the rate 
was kept equal to RT. 
DDoS Clients: SSFNet has a DDoS package that provides facilities to set up a DDoS 
attack. DDoSSession and DDoSSessionRand are two protocol session implementations of 
DDoS SYN packets. DDoSSessionRand has more advanced features than DDoSSession 
and also configures the attributes for the master and agents automatically. For one of the 
clients (nodes) of a DDoS client we have to have 3 clients incorporated in a single node 
so that we can have an attacker, master and the zombie. For all the other DDoS clients the 
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Background Traffic: Some background traffic – UDP was introduced in the simulation 
between nodes that are neither zombies nor host any Blue nodes to give the simulation a 
real approach.     
Unidirectional Links: Another problem we had to deal with during simulations was that 
unidirectional links had not yet been implemented in SSFNet. For our analysis we could 
not have bidirectional links as we use a directed graph structure. So we had to specify the 
bandwidth for each link separately. The bidirectional links would mean redundant 
bandwidth available which could lead to incorrect results. In order to incorporate simplex 
links in SSFNet, we set different bit rates at both ends of the link. So say if we have a 
bidirectional link between node A and node B, we can turn it in a unidirectional link from 
A to B by setting the bit rate at interface of B to a very low value like 1. In this way the 
packets will never be sent on the bidirectional link from B to A but packets from A to be 
B will be readily transferred.       
In order to run the DML file, one has to give the following command; 
java SSF.Net.Net <requested simulation end time in seconds> <Filename>.dml 
Monitoring: SSFNet supports efficient multi-point network monitoring infrastructure for 
collection of streaming and sampled data from many Monitors. The package 
SSF.Util.Streams together with SSFNet class SSF.OS.ProbeSession provides monitoring 
facilities. Monitoring in SSFNet is of two types, (i) Queue Monitoring (ii) IP Netflow 
Monitoring. Queue Monitoring is done at the session level, where packets can be 
captured at the router queues and analyzed for queue lengths, packet drops etc. IP 
Netflow Monitoring is used to monitor flows at routers, IP packet dumps on interfaces 
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and links, and analyze end to end flow. Flows can be further refined by additional 
attributes like protocol number, and can be aggregated in a variety of ways like by source 
and/or destination network prefix, for analysis purposes. For monitoring purposes the 
user has to specify the name of the stream and data file that collects the data for the 
particular stream. This data file can then be used to plot graphs for analysis or for 
animation of the network. For more information readers are referred to [66] or the 
ssfnet/examples/queueMonitorDemo directory. [67] gives additional information on the 
IP Netflow monitoring along with data format for the data file generated. 
Graphical representation: In SSFNet, there is provision for graphical representation and 
animation in the form of Raceway Viewer [66]. Raceway Views provides the framework 
for displaying network topology. The DML network configurations used by Raceway 
Views are the same as used in SSFNet, but in addition to logical configuration attributes 
for Nets, hosts, routers and links they include new graphics attributes specifying the 
locations, transformations, and rendering styles for Nets and for individual network 
elements. If no graphical attributes are supplied, SSFNet will assign the attributes to the 
nodes and the links randomly. One can fully customize in DML the rendering style, 
including link colors and stroke widths, icon selection and fill color, size and orientation 
for hosts, routers etc.  
Network Animation: The stream generated from the simulation can also be played using a 
player written in java. Though there are some examples of the different players in the 
animation/players directory, these are written with specific DML files in mind. For the 
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simulations presented here, a player was written that was built on the droptail player 
example in the animations directory. 
Figure 26 represents a snapshot of the Raceway viewer for three blue nodes and four 
physical nodes. The Raceway Viewer has three windows/components. The first is the 
network renderer. It shows the network topology using the network configuration DML 
files. One can change the background color, and the position of the network elements.  
The second record animation component is the running display of a textual representation 
of network records in the format - timestamp, originating network element address, 
record type, total record length in bytes, followed by record-type-specific measurement 
data bytes. These records can be examined for drill-down analysis. The third component 
is a set of VCR-like control buttons (Play, Stop, Rewind, Forward, etc) that are present 
on the sidebar. The user can add or remove buttons according to his convenience. 
To run the animations and start Raceway Viewer the following command should be 
given; 
java RacewayViewer <Filename>.dml   -s <DataFile>.dat –p <Player>.java                     -
start 30 -stop 10000 (optional - if the start/stop options are provided, they define the 
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